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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

LittleLooter

Tracked since Mar 18, 2026 · Updated 8 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs3Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Magic Hound

LittleLooter • Masquerades as WhatsApp for Android • Multi-functional backdoor • HTTP/SMS C2 communications

via i blackhat archivei.blackhat.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1593.001Social MediaEvidence1

LittleLooter is functionally rich, providing ITG18 operators the following capabilities on an infected Android device: ... List contact information

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

While X-Force did not observe how initial access to the accounts was gained, ITG18 could have leveraged LittleLooter’s capabilities or used phishing/social engineering to gather account credentials from their targets.

Execution

1 technique
T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

“...a malicious application they dubbed LittleLooter... The applications are delivered to victims via social engineering attacks, sometimes involving the operators directly engaging with victims.”

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Tactics • Phishing (email, social Media, SMS), credential harvesting, leveraging compromised accounts, masquerading as legitimate organizations/individuals

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Info Stealers & Keyloggers: The group’s toolkit includes browser info stealers and keyloggers.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

LittleLooter is functionally rich, providing ITG18 operators the following capabilities on an infected Android device: ... List device information ... List installed apps ... List storage information ... List SIM card information

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Complete list of LittleLooter commands ... directory_list List files in a directory ... file_list List files in storage

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The stolen data contained photos associated with the victim, contact lists, group memberships and conversations.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Info Stealers & Keyloggers: The group’s toolkit includes browser info stealers and keyloggers.

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

LittleLooter is functionally rich, providing ITG18 operators the following capabilities on an infected Android device: ... Record sound ... Record voice call

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

LittleLooter is functionally rich, providing ITG18 operators the following capabilities on an infected Android device: Record video ... Record live screen ... Take a picture

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

• HTTP/SMS C2 communications

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

For C2 communication, LittleLooter attempts to establish communication to the C2 server via HTTP POST requests and responses.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The tool updates itself by downloading a zip file from a URL on the C2 server: “ http[:]//[C2server]/updates/update_[class name].zip” and replacing the old “classes.dex” file with the newer version from the zip file.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

X-Force revealed ITG18 exfiltrated roughly 120 gigabytes of information from approximately 20 individuals aligned with the Reformist movement in Iran.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching3Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.