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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Also detected during the attacks is a kernel rootkit called "Fire Chili" that's digitally signed with stolen certificates from game development companies, enabling it to evade detection by security software and conceal malicious file operations, processes, registry key additions, and network connections.
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Also detected during the attacks is a kernel rootkit called "Fire Chili" that's digitally signed with stolen certificates from game development companies, enabling it to evade detection by security software and conceal malicious file operations, processes, registry key additions, and network connections.
Furthermore, we introduced the previously unknown Fire Chili rootkit and two compromised digital signatures... Fire Chili is a novel strain with a unique code base...
4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Also detected during the attacks is a kernel rootkit called "Fire Chili" that's digitally signed with stolen certificates from game development companies, enabling it to evade detection by security software and conceal malicious file operations, processes, registry key additions, and network connections.
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A kernel rootkit used in the same intrusion set to evade detection and hide malicious files, processes, registry keys, and network connections. It uses ioctl system calls to conceal the rootkit registry key, Milestone backdoor files, and the loader file and process.
Windows kernel-mode rootkit (driver crtsys.sys) signed with stolen certificates. Uses DKOM and other kernel techniques to hide/protect attacker artifacts: hides files via a filesystem minifilter, hides/protects processes (including stripping PROCESS_TERMINATE rights and unlinking from ActiveProcessLinks), hides registry keys (REGEDIT-specific filtering), and hides network connections by intercepting NSI/TCP query IOCTLs. Configurable via IOCTLs through \Device\crtsys; supports only specific Windows builds (up to Windows 10 RS2 per the report).
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.