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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 1 actor

Susanoo

Susanoo is an EDR killer observed by ESET in ransomware intrusions, specifically in activity attributed to the DeadLock gang. It is used to disable or interfere with endpoint detection and response products prior to ransomware deployment, fitting ESET’s assessment that EDR killers are a fundamental stage of modern ransomware attacks after attackers obtain high privileges. ESET reported that Susanoo includes a graphical user interface and process-targeting options, including a dedicated Sophos-related process list and a broader TNT process list. In addition to Susanoo, DeadLock was observed using another EDR killer called DLKiller as well as anti-rootkit tools such as GMER and PC Hunter. The available content does not provide specific infection vectors, technical implementation details such as BYOVD usage, or concrete indicators of compromise for Susanoo.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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DeadLock

ESET researchers have observed DeadLock using two EDR killers, DLKiller (also mentioned as an unnamed loader by Cisco Talos) and Susanoo, and anti-rootkits such as GMER and PC Hunter.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence2

BYOVD-based EDR killers exploit vulnerable drivers to escalate kernel-level privileges.

Impact

1 technique
T1489Service StopEvidence1

EDR killers stop protected services of security products and tamper with their functionality.

Other

2 techniques
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

Over the past year, security researchers have observed an expansion of the ecosystem around these tools, which can disable endpoint detection and response (EDR) platforms and other threat detection products in a targeted environment.

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

EDR killers terminate or suspend EDR/AV processes and services to bypass detection.

What this page doesn’t show

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IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping4

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.