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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

credential stealer

Tracked since Mar 25, 2026 · Updated 8 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs94Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

Credential Stealer DLL file that steals credentials... Persistence was achieved by using Windows standard function, Security Package system.

via vb2020 vblocalhostvb2020.vblocalhost.com
CryptoMimic

Credential Stealer DLL file that steals credentials... Persistence was achieved by using Windows standard function, Security Package system.

via vb2020 vblocalhostvb2020.vblocalhost.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

Checkmarx suffered a breach late last month following the Trivy supply chain attack, as a result of which two of its GitHub Actions workflows and two plugins distributed via the Open VSX marketplace were tampered with to push a credential stealer...

T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence1

...two of its GitHub Actions workflows and two plugins distributed via the Open VSX marketplace were tampered with to push a credential stealer capable of harvesting a wide range of developer secrets.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.005Security Support ProviderEvidence2

The command in Figure 33 sets a DLL file named ‘bcs’ as Security Packages.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.005Security Support ProviderEvidence2

The command in Figure 33 sets a DLL file named ‘bcs’ as Security Packages.

Stealth

1 technique
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

browser info stealer itself and its output were deleted after execution... lsass.exe deleted credential stealer.

Credential Access

6 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

We suspect that it is a piece of malware that steals credentials because it uses Security Packages.

T1003.001LSASS MemoryEvidence1

11:47 msoRAT injected something into lsass.exe process.

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

...tampered with to push a credential stealer capable of harvesting a wide range of developer secrets.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence5

stage 3 ( components: encryptor, SMB/USB worm, lockscreen, credential stealer, VBS spreader, chat utility )

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

These credentials could be browser stored credentials... as well as auto filled credentials stored in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\IntelliForms\Storage2.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence2

...deployment of ... credential stealer...

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Cabbage RAT-C downloaded and executed browser info stealer... Cabbage RAT-C downloaded and executed msoRAT... msoRAT downloaded credential stealer.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

...for malware hosting, C2 infrastructure, and victim log exfiltration... The operation also performs telemetry collection, file exfiltration...

Indicators of compromise

Observables

94 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching94Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.