Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Credential Stealer DLL file that steals credentials... Persistence was achieved by using Windows standard function, Security Package system.
Credential Stealer DLL file that steals credentials... Persistence was achieved by using Windows standard function, Security Package system.
12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
We suspect that it is a piece of malware that steals credentials because it uses Security Packages.
...tampered with to push a credential stealer capable of harvesting a wide range of developer secrets.
Once executed, the malware fetches credentials stored in Windows vaults... browser stored credentials, domain credentials, and Windows credentials
92 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.