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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 1 actor

reGeorge

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Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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FIN13

Following the initial web shell, a set of both open-source web shells, such as “JspSpy,” “reGeorge,” “MiniWebCmdShell,” “Vonloesch Jsp File Browser 1.2” and custom web shells were uploaded separately or as a bundle and were used by the group.

via web archiveweb.archive.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

The group’s preferred targets are Java-based web servers, typically WebSphere and WebLogic. They exploit web servers using known vulnerabilities to infiltrate organizations.

Persistence

1 technique
T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

The basic payload for these exploits was either a simple obfuscated web shell enabling remote code execution... Following the initial web shell, a set of both open-source web shells, such as “JspSpy,” “reGeorge,” “MiniWebCmdShell,” “Vonloesch Jsp File Browser 1.2” and custom web shells were uploaded separately or as a bundle and were used by the group.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

The access to and from the compromised assets are mainly achieved by the group’s web shells and Java tools, both custom and open source, that provide tunneling capabilities of TCP packets and HTTP requests.

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence1

Elephant Beetle deploy several tools for tunneling HTTP requests to web shells on internal web servers... One tool the group used was a custom web shell that receives HTTP parameters of a target host port and an encoded HTTP request payload (as a hex-string), creates a connection to the target machine, sends the request and prints the response.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping4

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.