Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

undicy-http

Tracked since Apr 1, 2026 · Updated 8 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs4Tracked
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
LofyGang

A malicious npm package named undicy-http has surfaced inside the Node.js developer ecosystem... The package (version 2.0.0) delivers two payloads that work in parallel.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence1

A malicious npm package named undicy-http has surfaced inside the Node.js developer ecosystem... The package impersonates undici, the official HTTP client library bundled with Node.js

Execution

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

It first creates a scheduled task named ScreenLiveClient that launches at login with the highest available system privileges.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

If not, it writes a VBScript file to the system’s temp folder and re-launches itself using wscript.exe with a hidden window

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

The first is a Node.js-based Remote Access Trojan... When a developer installs undicy-http, the main script (index.js) checks immediately whether it is running as a hidden process.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

It first creates a scheduled task named ScreenLiveClient that launches at login with the highest available system privileges.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

If that step fails, it falls back to writing a registry run key. As a final option, it places a copy of itself in the Windows Startup folder.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

It first creates a scheduled task named ScreenLiveClient that launches at login with the highest available system privileges.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

If that step fails, it falls back to writing a registry run key. As a final option, it places a copy of itself in the Windows Startup folder.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

To deceive the victim, it pops up a fake missing-DLL Windows error dialog while the payload continues running silently in the background.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

the malware runs ten anti-VM checks targeting MAC addresses, BIOS strings, disk names, and active processes to detect sandbox environments such as ANY.RUN, Cuckoo, and Triage.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

the malware runs ten anti-VM checks targeting MAC addresses, BIOS strings, disk names, and active processes

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

The VBScript launcher file is then hidden using attrib +h +s to avoid easy detection.

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

it writes a VBScript file to the system’s temp folder and re-launches itself using wscript.exe with a hidden window, leaving no visible trace of execution

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

It also looks for analysis tools like Wireshark, IDA, and Ghidra.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

the malware runs ten anti-VM checks targeting MAC addresses, BIOS strings, disk names, and active processes to detect sandbox environments such as ANY.RUN, Cuckoo, and Triage.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

the malware runs ten anti-VM checks targeting MAC addresses, BIOS strings, disk names, and active processes

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

It also looks for analysis tools like Wireshark, IDA, and Ghidra.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The first is a Node.js-based Remote Access Trojan that connects to an attacker-controlled WebSocket server

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

The first is a Node.js-based Remote Access Trojan that connects to an attacker-controlled WebSocket server, enabling remote shell execution, screen streaming, file uploads, and microphone and webcam recording.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

Stolen data moves through two channels simultaneously — a Discord webhook and a Telegram bot — with large files first uploaded to gofile.io or catbox.moe before download links reach the attacker.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching4Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.