Skip to main content
Mallory
Back to malware
MalwareUsed by 1 actor

chromelevator.exe

chromelevator.exe is a native Windows credential-stealing payload observed in two distinct malicious contexts: as an embedded component of KORTEX Stealer v3.51.2 and as a payload delivered by the malicious npm package undicy-http. In KORTEX, chromelevator.exe is extracted at runtime from resource ID 101 (RT_RCDATA) and executed as a separate process. It is described as a dedicated bypass tool for Chrome App-Bound Encryption introduced in Chrome v127, abusing Chrome Mojo IPC named pipes rather than exploiting a CVE or patching Chrome binaries. Reported pipe patterns include mojo.%u.%u.%04X.chrome, chrome.sync.%u.%u.%04X, and chrome.nacl.%u_%04X, and results are returned via the named pipe DLL_PIPE_COMPLETION_SIGNAL. Strings including "App-Bound Encryption Key" and "Copilot App-Bound Encryption Key" indicate targeting of Chrome and Edge-related encrypted storage. The referenced sample was reportedly compiled on 2026-01-24 with SHA256 a95ad2f5dec66f6ce6c7ab58d158b64225437e42e2397b8f958bfa507ebb7dbe. In the undicy-http campaign, chromelevator.exe is a native Windows executable that injects into browser processes at the OS level and steals passwords, cookies, credit card numbers, IBANs, and session tokens from more than 50 browsers and over 90 cryptocurrency wallet extensions. It also targeted session data from Roblox, Instagram, Spotify, TikTok, Steam, and Telegram, as well as 28 desktop cryptocurrency wallets and six hardware wallet integrations including Ledger and Trezor. The broader campaign was attributed by JFrog to LofyGang, with exfiltration via Discord webhook and Telegram bot, and large stolen files uploaded to gofile.io or catbox.moe. The sample reportedly matched YARA rule MAL_Browser_Stealer_Dec25_2 associated with the broader GlassWorm Campaign framework. Across the provided reporting, chromelevator.exe is consistently characterized as a Windows browser-focused stealer and credential access tool used to bypass browser protections and extract sensitive data including cookies, saved credentials, payment data, wallet material, and session tokens.

Share:
For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
LofyGang

The second is a native Windows executable called chromelevator.exe, which injects into browser processes at the operating system level to steal passwords, cookies, credit card numbers, IBANs, and session tokens from over 50 browsers and 90 cryptocurrency wallet extensions.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

On March 29, 2026, the npm maintainer consolelofy published a package called undicy-http -- a typosquat of undici, Node.js's official HTTP client library. Two days later, on April 1, the same account published separadordeinfocc.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

When chromelevator cannot execute (insufficient privileges, Chrome not running, etc.), KORTEX falls back to a PowerShell-based technique that launches Chrome with remote debugging enabled and extracts cookies through the Chrome DevTools Protocol

T1106Native APIEvidence1

Rather than relying on common API functions that endpoint security products actively watch, it resolves low-level functions from ntdll.dll at runtime through direct syscalls.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

The malware bundles a Node.js-based loader with a native C++ payload that is injected directly into live browser memory during execution.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

it queries the Windows registry to locate installed browsers and then launches the identified browser in a suspended state, temporarily halting the process before it becomes fully active. The loader then maps the payload directly into the browser’s memory space

Stealth

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

The malware bundles a Node.js-based loader with a native C++ payload that is injected directly into live browser memory during execution.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

it queries the Windows registry to locate installed browsers and then launches the identified browser in a suspended state, temporarily halting the process before it becomes fully active. The loader then maps the payload directly into the browser’s memory space

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

NYX reads leveldb databases and Local State files, decrypts tokens protected by DPAPI using a PowerShell helper, and validates every recovered token against the Discord API...

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence3

The malware covers a wide range of targets, hitting eight major browsers including Chrome, Edge, Brave, Opera GX, and Firefox, while extracting cookies, saved passwords, payment card details, active session tokens, and IBANs from each one.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

Once injected and fully active inside the browser, the payload extracts cookies, stored passwords, session tokens, payment card data, and IBANs across eight targeted browsers.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence2

KORTEX handles three generations of Chrome credential protection in a single binary: Pre-v80 : Direct DPAPI via CryptUnprotectData v80 to v126 : AES-256-GCM decryption via BCryptDecrypt with DPAPI-protected keys v127+ : The embedded chromelevator.exe bypass

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence2

Every piece of stolen data is sent through two independent channels simultaneously: Channel 1: Discord webhook... Channel 2: Telegram bot... For large files... NYX uploads to GoFile or Catbox and sends the download link through both channels.

Other

1 technique
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

chromelevator.exe goes even further by using direct syscalls that sidestep standard ntdll.dll APIs, bypassing EDR and antivirus hooks at the user-mode level.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
5 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
3 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching9

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping11

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.