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Malware1 associated actor

BLACKNET-00

Tracked since Apr 2, 2026 · Updated 8 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK7Techniques
IOCs4Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Infrastructure Destruction Squad

The publicly released BLACKNET-00 builder generates a C++ payload that encrypts files, modifies endpoint policy, establishes persistence, captures screenshots, reports victim data through Telegram, and displays a ransom interface.

via ransom isac blogransom-isac.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

On the persistence front, the platform reportedly supports Registry Run key injection and Scheduled Task creation (both standard MITRE ATT&CK T1547 and T1053 techniques)

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

but extends into more sophisticated territory with DLL Hijacking (T1574.001). DLL hijacking, where a malicious library is placed in a path searched before the legitimate one

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

On the persistence front, the platform reportedly supports Registry Run key injection and Scheduled Task creation (both standard MITRE ATT&CK T1547 and T1053 techniques)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

On the persistence front, the platform reportedly supports Registry Run key injection and Scheduled Task creation (both standard MITRE ATT&CK T1547 and T1053 techniques)

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

On the persistence front, the platform reportedly supports Registry Run key injection and Scheduled Task creation (both standard MITRE ATT&CK T1547 and T1053 techniques)

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

On the persistence front, the platform reportedly supports Registry Run key injection and Scheduled Task creation (both standard MITRE ATT&CK T1547 and T1053 techniques)

Stealth

3 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The platform’s Anti-VM and Anti-Sandbox detection is particularly telling... By refusing to execute in detected virtual environments (MITRE ATT&CK T1497), the payload actively degrades the quality of automated threat intelligence collection.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

The delayed execution capability (T1497.003) targets the time-bound analysis windows of most sandbox deployments — typically two to five minutes of monitored execution.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

but extends into more sophisticated territory with DLL Hijacking (T1574.001). DLL hijacking, where a malicious library is placed in a path searched before the legitimate one

Discovery

2 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The platform’s Anti-VM and Anti-Sandbox detection is particularly telling... By refusing to execute in detected virtual environments (MITRE ATT&CK T1497), the payload actively degrades the quality of automated threat intelligence collection.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

The delayed execution capability (T1497.003) targets the time-bound analysis windows of most sandbox deployments — typically two to five minutes of monitored execution.

Collection

1 technique
T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

The basis offered for all of it was data exfiltrated from the company’s IT systems, which is a station list rather than an OT foothold.

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence2

Analysis revealed that Qilin had encrypted a logistics company in the East African Region following a prolonged infiltration...

Indicators of compromise

Observables

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching4Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping7Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.