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Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

Nosedive

Tracked since Apr 11, 2026 · Updated 8 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs20Tracked
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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2024-21887via bleeping computerExploited in the wildCommand Injection in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy SecureBlack Lotus Labs notes that the botnet was also involved in exploitation attempts against Atlassian Confluence servers and Ivanti Connect Secure appliances (likely via CVE-2024-21887) at organizations in the same activity sectors.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Flax Typhoon

The primary implant seen on most of the Tier 1 nodes, which Black Lotus Labs calls “Nosedive”, is a custom variation of the Mirai implant that is supported on all major SOHO and IoT architectures (e.g. MIPS, ARM, SuperH, PowerPC, etc.).

via lumen black lotus labslumen.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1584.005BotnetEvidence2

Black Lotus Labs began an investigation into compromised routers that led to the discovery of a large, multi-tiered botnet consisting of small office/home office (SOHO) and IoT devices... We call this botnet “Raptor Train.”

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

The operators are likely exploiting more than 20 different device types with both 0-day and n-day (known) vulnerabilities for inclusion as Tier 1 nodes.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

Once deployed, Nosedive runs in-memory only and allows the operators to execute commands, upload and download files, and run DDoS attacks on compromised devices.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

The researchers say that Raptor Train operators add devices in Tier 1 likely by exploiting “exploiting more than 20 different device types with both 0-day and n-day (known) vulnerabilities.”

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Nosedive implants are delivered via multi-stage droppers using encoded URL schemes, making detection challenging.

T1027.011Fileless StorageEvidence1

Once deployed, the malware operates entirely in-memory... This memory-resident nature, combined with anti-forensics techniques such as obfuscated processes and multi-stage infections, complicates detection and analysis.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

This, in addition to anti-forensics techniques employed on these devices including the obfuscation of running process names... makes detection and forensics much more difficult.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence2

All samples Black Lotus Labs found of Nosedive and its associated droppers were memory-resident only and deleted from disk.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

All samples Black Lotus Labs found of Nosedive and its associated droppers were memory-resident only and deleted from disk.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

The C2 servers in Tier 2 receive the callbacks from compromised devices in Tier 1 over port 443.

T1104Multi-Stage ChannelsEvidence1

The ‘second stage’ servers often host their payloads on high, random ephemeral ports... and are used in multi-stage droppers.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

This service enables an entire suite of activities, including scalable exploitation of bots, vulnerability and exploit management, remote management of C2 infrastructure, file uploads and downloads...

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence1

Initially, the root domain k3121.com was used as the sole C2 domain, but by mid-2021, the operators began using encoded random alphanumeric C2 subdomains...

Impact

1 technique
T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence3

Once deployed, Nosedive runs in-memory only and allows the operators to execute commands, upload and download files, and run DDoS attacks on compromised devices.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

20 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching20Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.