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MalwareUsed by 1 actorExploits 1 CVE

Nosedive

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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2024-21887Command Injection in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure Web ComponentsExploited in the wild

Black Lotus Labs notes that the botnet was also involved in exploitation attempts against Atlassian Confluence servers and Ivanti Connect Secure appliances (likely via CVE-2024-21887) at organizations in the same activity sectors.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Flax Typhoon

The primary implant seen on most of the Tier 1 nodes, which Black Lotus Labs calls “Nosedive”, is a custom variation of the Mirai implant that is supported on all major SOHO and IoT architectures (e.g. MIPS, ARM, SuperH, PowerPC, etc.).

via lumen black lotus labslumen.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1584.005BotnetEvidence2

Black Lotus Labs began an investigation into compromised routers that led to the discovery of a large, multi-tiered botnet consisting of small office/home office (SOHO) and IoT devices... We call this botnet “Raptor Train.”

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

The operators are likely exploiting more than 20 different device types with both 0-day and n-day (known) vulnerabilities for inclusion as Tier 1 nodes.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2
TacticExecution

Once deployed, Nosedive runs in-memory only and allows the operators to execute commands, upload and download files, and run DDoS attacks on compromised devices.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

The researchers say that Raptor Train operators add devices in Tier 1 likely by exploiting “exploiting more than 20 different device types with both 0-day and n-day (known) vulnerabilities.”

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

Nosedive implants are delivered via multi-stage droppers using encoded URL schemes, making detection challenging.

T1027.011Fileless StorageEvidence1
TacticStealth

Once deployed, the malware operates entirely in-memory... This memory-resident nature, combined with anti-forensics techniques such as obfuscated processes and multi-stage infections, complicates detection and analysis.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

This, in addition to anti-forensics techniques employed on these devices including the obfuscation of running process names... makes detection and forensics much more difficult.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence2
TacticStealth

All samples Black Lotus Labs found of Nosedive and its associated droppers were memory-resident only and deleted from disk.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1
TacticStealth

All samples Black Lotus Labs found of Nosedive and its associated droppers were memory-resident only and deleted from disk.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

The C2 servers in Tier 2 receive the callbacks from compromised devices in Tier 1 over port 443.

T1104Multi-Stage ChannelsEvidence1

The ‘second stage’ servers often host their payloads on high, random ephemeral ports... and are used in multi-stage droppers.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

This service enables an entire suite of activities, including scalable exploitation of bots, vulnerability and exploit management, remote management of C2 infrastructure, file uploads and downloads...

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence1

Initially, the root domain k3121.com was used as the sole C2 domain, but by mid-2021, the operators began using encoded random alphanumeric C2 subdomains...

Impact

1 technique
T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence3
TacticImpact

Once deployed, Nosedive runs in-memory only and allows the operators to execute commands, upload and download files, and run DDoS attacks on compromised devices.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

20 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
11 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
9 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching20

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping14

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.