Malware

TinyPOS

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Legitimate user accounts, including an administrator account, were compromised as part of this phishing attack and were used by the threat actors to login to the merchant’s environment.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

Initial access to the merchant network was obtained through a phishing campaign that targeted employees at the merchant.

Execution

2 techniques

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

The batch file contains a call to powershell.exe and a provided base64 encoded command. The command is a standard implementation of reflective injection using PowerShell

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

1. A .bat file executes a PowerShell script

Persistence

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Legitimate user accounts, including an administrator account, were compromised as part of this phishing attack and were used by the threat actors to login to the merchant’s environment.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Once a target process has been located the shellcode parses the memory for credit card track data

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Legitimate user accounts, including an administrator account, were compromised as part of this phishing attack and were used by the threat actors to login to the merchant’s environment.

Stealth

5 techniques

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence2

The attackers appended raw shellcode after the end of file (EOF) marker for the PNG file. This is an old tactic that allows the file to be properly rendered by an image viewer, while still concealing the appended data.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Once a target process has been located the shellcode parses the memory for credit card track data

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Legitimate user accounts, including an administrator account, were compromised as part of this phishing attack and were used by the threat actors to login to the merchant’s environment.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

4. The shellcode decodes itself into the TinyPOS malware

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

The command is a standard implementation of reflective injection using PowerShell that is prevalent in many open source frameworks.

Discovery

1 technique

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

The shellcode will then enumerate the processes running on the system and specifically look for process names which contain partial names of specific POS software.

Lateral Movement

1 technique

T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

The actors then used legitimate administrative tools to access the cardholder data environment (CDE) within the merchant’s network.

Collection

2 techniques

T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Once a target process has been located the shellcode parses the memory for credit card track data (specifically Track 1 & 2 data)

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

used a batch script to mass deploy the malware across the merchant’s network to target various locations and their respective POS environments

Command and Control

1 technique

T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

The shellcode then XOR encodes the scraped data and saves it to the following output log file

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

38 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

4 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

34 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

3 SOURCESView more in app

norfolkinfosec blogNews

Nov 1, 2020

TinyPOS and ProLocker: An Odd Relationship - One Night in Norfolk

Point-of-sale malware deployed via a batch file and PowerShell loader that reads shellcode appended to an image file, executes it in memory, and decodes into the TinyPOS payload. Samples were observed targeting POS-related processes and merchant environments.

threatpostNews

Mar 14, 2018

New POS Malware PinkKite Takes Flight | Threatpost

Referenced as a comparable small POS malware family.

usa visaNews

Aug 14, 2026

POS malware used against a North American hospitality merchant to scrape Track 1 and Track 2 payment card data from process memory, validate card numbers with the Luhn algorithm, XOR-encode the harvested data, and save it to local log files for later exfiltration.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching38

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping13

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

Malware

TinyPOS

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Legitimate user accounts, including an administrator account, were compromised as part of this phishing attack and were used by the threat actors to login to the merchant’s environment.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

Initial access to the merchant network was obtained through a phishing campaign that targeted employees at the merchant.

Execution

2 techniques

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

The batch file contains a call to powershell.exe and a provided base64 encoded command. The command is a standard implementation of reflective injection using PowerShell

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

1. A .bat file executes a PowerShell script

Persistence

1 technique

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Legitimate user accounts, including an administrator account, were compromised as part of this phishing attack and were used by the threat actors to login to the merchant’s environment.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Once a target process has been located the shellcode parses the memory for credit card track data

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Legitimate user accounts, including an administrator account, were compromised as part of this phishing attack and were used by the threat actors to login to the merchant’s environment.

Stealth

5 techniques

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence2

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Once a target process has been located the shellcode parses the memory for credit card track data

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Legitimate user accounts, including an administrator account, were compromised as part of this phishing attack and were used by the threat actors to login to the merchant’s environment.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

4. The shellcode decodes itself into the TinyPOS malware

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

The command is a standard implementation of reflective injection using PowerShell that is prevalent in many open source frameworks.

Discovery

1 technique

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

The shellcode will then enumerate the processes running on the system and specifically look for process names which contain partial names of specific POS software.

Lateral Movement

1 technique

T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

The actors then used legitimate administrative tools to access the cardholder data environment (CDE) within the merchant’s network.

Collection

2 techniques

T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Once a target process has been located the shellcode parses the memory for credit card track data (specifically Track 1 & 2 data)

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

used a batch script to mass deploy the malware across the merchant’s network to target various locations and their respective POS environments

Command and Control

1 technique

T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

The shellcode then XOR encodes the scraped data and saves it to the following output log file

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

38 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

4 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

34 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

3 SOURCESView more in app

norfolkinfosec blogNews

Nov 1, 2020

TinyPOS and ProLocker: An Odd Relationship - One Night in Norfolk

threatpostNews

Mar 14, 2018

New POS Malware PinkKite Takes Flight | Threatpost

Referenced as a comparable small POS malware family.

usa visaNews

Aug 14, 2026

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching38

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping13

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.