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Mallory
Malware

Ginp

Tracked since Apr 11, 2026 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs8Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationReconnaissanceDefense evasion
Delivery
PhishingLureMalvertising
Platforms
Android

Ginp is a financially motivated Android banking Trojan that steals banking credentials and payment card information through deceptive interfaces. It uses multi-step phishing overlays to capture banking login details and then solicit credit card numbers. Its additional capabilities include collecting and sending SMS messages, retrieving contact lists and device logs, and enumerating installed applications. Ginp has impersonated Adobe Flash Player and Google Play Verificator to appear legitimate. Its developers reused small portions of leaked Anubis code.

Ginp activity has been concentrated in Spain, with infections also observed in Greece, where Android/FakeAdBlocker delivered it through a deceptive advertising-driven distribution chain. Its operators have used a COVID-19-themed fraud campaign in which an attacker command causes an already infected device to open a fake Coronavirus Finder page. This page claims to locate nearby infected people and requests a small payment, but instead sends the victim's payment card details to the criminals.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence3

Fake device notifications A malicious application could send fake device notifications to the user. Clicking on the device notification could trigger the malicious application to display an input prompt.

Execution

1 technique
T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

to see such a web-page pop up on your device, you need to have Ginp on it first... Download apps only from Google Play (and disable the option to install apps from other sources).

Persistence

2 techniques
T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

A malicious application could create an application overlay window on top of a running legitimate application.

T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence2

When the malware is first launched on the device, it will start by hiding its icon from the app drawer... As second step it asks the victim for the Accessibility Service privileges.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

A malicious application could create an application overlay window on top of a running legitimate application.

T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence2

When the malware is first launched on the device, it will start by hiding its icon from the app drawer... As second step it asks the victim for the Accessibility Service privileges.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

Do not give the Accessibility permission to apps that request it, other than anti-virus apps.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

we will see it is nop code and obfuscated code which makes the analysis of the code more harder and it’s an indicator that the sample is packed... the packer is JsonPacker

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Agent Smith can impersonate any popular application on an infected device, and the core malware disguises itself as a legitimate Google application.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

After installing the malware, the malware will hide its icon and only the name of the malware MediaPlayer is visible. After enabling the Accessibility service, the malware will hide the icon and the name of the malware.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

And disable Play protect, not to label it as malicious and it won’t delete the malware.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056Input CaptureEvidence3

The web-page then offers you to input your card data to make the transaction... Ginp is a very capable banking Trojan that relies on a lot of different lures to make users input their credit card data into forms, so that it can steal it.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence4

Anubis can exfiltrate files encrypted with the ransomware module from the device and can modify external storage. BusyGasper can collect images stored on the device and browser history. CHEMISTGAMES can collect files from the filesystem and account information from Google Chrome.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence3

The web-page then offers you to input your card data to make the transaction... Ginp is a very capable banking Trojan that relies on a lot of different lures to make users input their credit card data into forms, so that it can steal it.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

else if ( s6 . equals ( "TAKE_SCREENSHOT" )) { globalService0 . Tools . takeScreenshot ( globalService0 ); }

Command and Control

1 technique
T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

These are not all the commands which are recived by the malware from the C2 server... START_APP ... GET_APPS ... UNINSTALL_APP ... TAKE_SCREENSHOT ... GET_CONTACTS ... ALL_SMS

Indicators of compromise

Observables

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

21 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching8Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.