SaveTheQueen is a ransomware family observed in public malware submissions, including samples seen on AnyRun in December 2019. The analyzed sample was identified as a .NET application and appears to wrap a PowerShell script using PS2EXE; embedded Base64-encoded and gzip-compressed content reportedly reveals an additional portable executable. The malware targets the C: drive and, after encryption, drops a log file named SaveTheQueen.LOG in C:\ProgramData. A notable characteristic is that it does not leave a ransom note or provide victim contact information. Reported host artifacts include registry modifications under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\RestartManager\Session00xx, including values such as Owner, SessionHash, RegFiles0000, and RegFilesHash; the RegFiles0000 value reportedly contains files to be encrypted or stolen. The behavior was compared to LockerGoga due to similar use of Restart Manager-related registry keys, although SaveTheQueen differs in implementation language and logging behavior. One analyzed sample was associated with SHA-256 3c9f777654a45eb6219f12c2ad10082043814389a4504c27e5aec752a8ee4ded, and a new variant was reportedly noted by MalwareHunterTeam on 2019-12-19.
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6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Referenced as another ransomware sample or family previously observed using IPLogger-related infrastructure.
A .NET ransomware sample wrapped from PowerShell via PS2EXE that encrypts files, drops a log file at C:\ProgramData\SaveTheQueen.LOG, and modifies RestartManager registry keys related to files targeted for encryption.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.