JanaWare
JanaWare is a ransomware family used in a geographically focused campaign targeting victims in Turkey, primarily home users and small to medium-sized businesses. Reporting attributes delivery to a customized Java-based Adwind RAT used as a loader and staging mechanism. Initial access is typically via phishing emails that deliver or link to malicious Java archive (JAR) files, including observed chains where Outlook opens a phishing message, Chrome retrieves a Google Drive-hosted payload, and the JAR executes via javaw.exe.
The malware is heavily obfuscated and polymorphic. Reported protections include the Java obfuscators Stringer and Allatori, custom class loaders, and a FilePumper component that modifies its own JAR by adding random content, inflating file size and causing different hashes per deployment. Embedded configuration reportedly includes a command-and-control domain, TCP ports, Tor-related paths, a version identifier, persistence-related settings, and a static PASSWORD value used both for initial authentication and for decrypting downloaded payloads.
JanaWare enforces strict geofencing. It checks system locale, language, country settings, and external IP geolocation, and proceeds only when Turkish regional indicators are present, including country code beginning with TR. If checks pass, the malware executes PowerShell and registry commands to weaken defenses, including attempts to disable or reduce Microsoft Defender protections, suppress security notifications, remove Volume Shadow Copy recovery mechanisms, hide ransomware protection features, enumerate installed antivirus products, and interfere with endpoint protection integrations.
After preparation, the Adwind-based loader downloads a Java ransomware plugin associated with JanaWare. The ransomware module reportedly communicates exclusively over Tor, uses AES encryption, and can encrypt files across available drives; reporting also states it can delete and exfiltrate files. During C2 handshake it uses the prefix JANAWARE. It drops Turkish-language ransom notes in multiple folders using partially randomized filenames with the fixed prefix ONEMLI_NOT. Victims are instructed to contact the operators via qTox and in some cases through a Tor Browser-accessible .onion site. Observed ransom demands were approximately $200 to $400, consistent with a low-value, high-volume extortion model.
The campaign has been assessed as active since at least 2020, with reporting indicating infrastructure remained active as late as November 2025. High-confidence infrastructure and sample indicators mentioned in the content include elementsplugin.duckdns.org resolving to 151.243.109.115 on ports 49152 and 49153; sample hash 4f0444e11633a331eddb0deeec17fd69 associated with Adwind RAT; and sample hash b2d5bbf7746c2cb87d5505ced8d6c4c6 associated with the JanaWare ransomware module.
Techniques & procedures
21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
The analysis indicates that the campaign relies on email-based phishing to initiate the attack, leading users to download a malicious payload that ultimately results in ransomware execution.
organizations in Turkey especially small businesses and home users should treat unsolicited emails linking to Google Drive downloads with extreme caution
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
After confirming the victim is located in Turkey, the malware turns off security defenses using PowerShell commands.
This activity is clearly part of a phishing campaign, where users are tricked into clicking a link in a deceptive email, ultimately downloading and running the ransomware.
A JAR file is downloaded and executed. Once executed via Java (javaw.exe), the malware establishes a foothold on the system.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
Once the geofencing checks pass, the malware executes a series of PowerShell and registry commands designed to weaken the system’s defenses before encryption begins.
Stealth
5 techniques
Stealth
JanaWare uses multiple layers of obfuscation to hinder analysis. Researchers observed the use of publicly available tools like Stringer and Allatori, combined with custom class loaders that complicate reverse engineering.
The malware modifies its own JAR file using a component called “FilePumper,” inserting random data to generate unique file hashes for each infection.
Remove recovery mechanisms such as Microsoft Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS).
Throughout this stage, both the RAT and the ransomware use simple but effective detection-evasion tactics such as common process names, basic anti-analysis checks, and environment awareness to limit their exposure to automated analysis systems.
Crucially, JanaWare enforces execution constraints based on system locale and IP geolocation, ensuring it only operates on systems within Turkey.
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
Once the geofencing checks pass, the malware executes a series of PowerShell and registry commands designed to weaken the system’s defenses before encryption begins.
After confirming the victim is located in Turkey, the malware turns off security defenses using PowerShell commands.
Discovery
4 techniques
Discovery
Enumerate installed antivirus products.
Throughout this stage, both the RAT and the ransomware use simple but effective detection-evasion tactics such as common process names, basic anti-analysis checks, and environment awareness to limit their exposure to automated analysis systems.
Crucially, JanaWare enforces execution constraints based on system locale and IP geolocation, ensuring it only operates on systems within Turkey.
These actions are designed to: ... Enumerate installed antivirus products.
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
Additionally, the malware contains hardcoded configuration data, including command-and-control (C2) infrastructure, authentication tokens, and TOR network settings for anonymized communication.
It also includes references to TOR-related paths and components, indicating that the malware can route over the TOR network... The module relies exclusively on Tor for command-and-control (C2) communication
The ransomware then downloads and runs its encryption module, which uses AES encryption and transmits the key directly to the C2 server over Tor, making file recovery without that key virtually impossible.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
The module relies exclusively on Tor for command-and-control (C2) communication and is capable not only of encrypting files but also of deleting and exfiltrating them.
Impact
3 techniques
Impact
The module relies exclusively on Tor for command-and-control (C2) communication and is capable not only of encrypting files but also of deleting and exfiltrating them.
This module is also implemented in Java, and it is responsible for encrypting files across all available drives... Based on static analysis of the Java classes, the ransomware employs AES encryption
These actions include: Removing Volume Shadow Copies to prevent recovery.
Observables
5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.