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Malware1 associated actor

AtExec

Tracked since Apr 15, 2026 · Updated 7 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK4Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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NightEagle

They used the atexec tool to create scheduled tasks and Windows port-forwarding rules, extending their reach through normal system functions.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Description Generated datasets for Windows Impacket AtExec Process Activity in attack range. MITRE ATT&CK Techniques ... Snapattack Path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1053/snapattack/snaattack.log

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

They used the atexec tool to create scheduled tasks and Windows port-forwarding rules, extending their reach through normal system functions.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Description Generated datasets for Windows Impacket AtExec Process Activity in attack range. MITRE ATT&CK Techniques ... Snapattack Path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1053/snapattack/snaattack.log

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

They used the atexec tool to create scheduled tasks and Windows port-forwarding rules, extending their reach through normal system functions.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Description Generated datasets for Windows Impacket AtExec Process Activity in attack range. MITRE ATT&CK Techniques ... Snapattack Path: /datasets/attack_techniques/T1053/snapattack/snaattack.log

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence5

They used the atexec tool to create scheduled tasks and Windows port-forwarding rules, extending their reach through normal system functions.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

They used the atexec tool to create scheduled tasks and Windows port-forwarding rules, extending their reach through normal system functions.

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

“These tasks enabled network port forwarding through standard Windows functionality: netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport = 443 connectaddress = 10.0.12.101 connectport = 445.”

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping4Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.