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Mallory
Malware

SaferRat

SaferRAT is an Android banking trojan identified by Zimperium zLabs as one of four active malware families alongside RecruitRat, Astrinox, and Massiv. It is associated with campaigns targeting more than 800 applications across banking, cryptocurrency, and social media platforms. SaferRAT is distributed via phishing and social-engineering lures, including fake streaming-service websites, enticing free premium offers, and a dropper masquerading as a Google Play Store update. The malware relies on sideloaded malicious APKs and has been reported to abuse Android’s Session Installation API as part of its installation chain.

Once installed, SaferRAT requests Accessibility Service permission and then uses non-interactive overlays to hide the granting of additional high-risk permissions, including access to contacts, device state, and SMS messages. With Accessibility access, it can read screen contents, monitor user interactions, perform clicks, swipes, and typing, create overlays, freeze or obstruct the screen, and make removal difficult. SaferRAT has been observed manipulating system navigation to hinder uninstallation and using Accessibility Services to block uninstall attempts after receiving the enable_anti_delete command from its command-and-control server.

The malware enumerates installed applications to identify banking, cryptocurrency, and social-media targets, then launches app-specific attacks. It uses overlay techniques to present fake PIN unlock screens and cloned login interfaces over legitimate apps in order to capture device passcodes, patterns, credentials, and authentication codes in real time. Reporting also states that SaferRAT can steal contacts and SMS messages, intercept one-time passwords, keylog user input, record or stream screen content via Android MediaProjection, and load remote phishing pages through WebView. SaferRAT and RecruitRat were also reported to hide secondary payloads in res or assets directories, sometimes load external DEX files with DexClassLoader, and use ZIP-level APK tampering, encrypted strings, and reflection to hinder analysis.

SaferRAT was designated based on the recurring class name com.example.safeservice found across associated samples. High-confidence indicators and traits directly mentioned in the source material include the class name com.example.safeservice, fake streaming-service lure infrastructure, fake Google Play update-themed droppers, use of Accessibility abuse and overlays, anti-uninstall behavior tied to the enable_anti_delete command, and Android APK artifacts tracked in saferRat-apks.csv.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

These malware families, named RecruitRat, SaferRat, Astrinox, and Massiv, employ various tactics like phishing and smishing to trick users into downloading malicious APK files.

Persistence

1 technique
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence1

The dropper now requests Accessibility Service permission... with this permission, an app can: Read screen contents Monitor interactions Carry out tasks on the user’s behalf(clicks, swipes, typing) Create an overlay on top of other apps.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence1

The dropper now requests Accessibility Service permission... with this permission, an app can: Read screen contents Monitor interactions Carry out tasks on the user’s behalf(clicks, swipes, typing) Create an overlay on top of other apps.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Because these payloads come from either fake apps or cloned legitimate ones, they need to be sideloaded... During observation, the dropper masquerades as a Google Play Store update prompt, urging the user to install a fake update.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

SaferRat, for example, manipulates system navigation to make it difficult for users to delete it. RecruitRat, on the other hand, applies transparency effects, making it vanish from the app drawer.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

They can also intercept one-time passwords (OTPs) sent via text and use keylogging to record every tap.

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

They can also intercept one-time passwords (OTPs) sent via text...

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Once installed, these malware families launch overlay attacks, presenting fake login screens over legitimate banking and crypto apps.

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

They can also intercept one-time passwords (OTPs) sent via text and use keylogging to record every tap.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

They abuse Accessibility Service permissions to freeze the screen, while secretly capturing credentials, contacts, SMS messages, and even recording the screen.

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Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping8

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.