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Mallory
Malware

Exobot

Tracked since Apr 16, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs21Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceSpoofing
Platforms
Android

Exobot is an Android banking trojan first observed in 2016 and associated with credential theft, SMS interception, and phishing overlays targeting financial applications. It has been described as one of the more active Android banking malware families of its period and is widely regarded as part of the broader Android banking trojan ecosystem alongside families such as BankBot, MazarBot, and Anubis. Exobot has also been linked historically to later descendants and rebrands including ExobotCompact and malware tracked as Coper or Octo.

The malware is designed to steal banking credentials and facilitate account takeover and fraud on infected Android devices. Reported capabilities include displaying phishing popups or overlay-style prompts when targeted applications are running, using web injects to capture user credentials, intercepting and forwarding SMS messages, accessing the victim’s contact list, and enumerating installed applications. Exobot has also been observed detecting antivirus applications and attempting to close them, indicating explicit defense-evasion behavior. For command and control, it has used HTTPS communications.

Exobot supports persistence on Android by registering for device boot events so that it can automatically activate after reboot. It has also been noted for masquerading as legitimate applications or trusted brands, including popular consumer services, to improve installation success and reduce suspicion. Across reporting, Android banking trojans of this class have commonly been distributed as trojanized or deceptive apps via unofficial channels, malicious links, and at times official app marketplaces; however, the specific delivery mechanism for Exobot itself is not established here at high confidence beyond masquerading as legitimate apps.

Historically, Exobot was offered as a malware service before its source code was sold and later leaked, a development that increased concern about derivative variants and broader criminal adoption. Security reporting has also noted that Exobot was based on Marcher code and that campaigns targeted financial institutions in multiple countries including Turkey, France, Germany, Australia, Thailand, and Japan. Its combination of overlay phishing, SMS interception, app discovery, and boot persistence made it a significant Android banking threat and an important ancestor in the evolution of later mobile banking malware families.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence2

Web injects (show phising over targeted app names to steal data, username,password,telepin whatever you want)

Persistence

1 technique
T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

A malicious application could create an application overlay window on top of a running legitimate application.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

A malicious application could create an application overlay window on top of a running legitimate application.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

Agent Smith can impersonate any popular application on an infected device, and the core malware disguises itself as a legitimate Google application.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

Exo includes a feature that prevents the trojan from executing on devices from users located in former Soviet states, and the US.

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

Web injects (show phising over targeted app names to steal data, username,password,telepin whatever you want)

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The keylogger functionality is a primary feature of Coper/Octo, enabling it to log every keystroke made on the victim’s phone.

T1111Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionEvidence1

Intercepting, redirecting, sending and deleting SMS messages, to bypass SMS-based 2-factor authentication

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

Harvest entered credentials or credit/debit card details and send them to the C&C server

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

SMS intercept (send the sms content to admin panel in real time. If is desired with jabber notifications too, can be configured for a target or by sender phone numbers)

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

AbstractEmu can collect device IP address and SIM information; Android/SpyAgent has collected device network information, such as the IMEI and the phone number; ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A gathers the device IMEI and IMSI; many listed mobile malware families collect IMEI, IMSI, ICCID, MEID, serial number, phone number, MAC address, IP address, carrier, MCC/MNC, and related device/network identifiers.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

Exo includes a feature that prevents the trojan from executing on devices from users located in former Soviet states, and the US.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

CC Stealer (Steal CCs data Including VBV/MSC/SAFEKEY )

T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

Web injects (show phising over targeted app names to steal data, username,password,telepin whatever you want)

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The keylogger functionality is a primary feature of Coper/Octo, enabling it to log every keystroke made on the victim’s phone.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

AbstractEmu can use HTTP to communicate with the C2 server; AhRat can communicate with the C2 using HTTPS requests; BRATA can use both HTTP and WebSockets to communicate with the C2 server; LightSpy has used both HTTPS and Websockets to communicate with the C2.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

send the sms content to admin panel in real time ... Jabber notifications for incoming new CCs or WebInject data or the SMS from specified phone numbers Collected

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

Lock / unlock device with a password / disable screen and phone use also can show a custom page on locked screen

Indicators of compromise

Observables

21 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching21Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.