Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
In the Bissa Scanner case, the threat actor used a combination of Claude Code and OpenClaw as an attack orchestration tool to automate large-scale scanning that exploited a vulnerability in the Next.js framework (CVE-2025-55182).
The scanner also includes a dedicated WordPress module targeting CVE-2025-9501, an unauthenticated command injection in the W3 Total Cache plugin (versions prior to 2.8.13, CVSS 9.0).
17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
That staged dataset included Plaid tokens, linked bank-account data, IRS transcript material, ACH-related records, Twilio calls, Salesforce contacts, and case data containing SSN and DOB fields.
The scanner was configured to watch its local results/ directory, batch *.env files into ZIPs, and upload them to hxxps://s3.filebase[.]com in bucket bissapromax under the archives/ prefix.
Bissa is a modular mass-exploitation platform built around React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182), with 900+ confirmed compromises across millions of scanned Next.js endpoints
The scanner relies on an acquirer file containing targets and a lease file defining the exploit type... deploying a payload intended to enumerate .env files, cloud metadata, Kubernetes service account context, local credential stores, database and Redis access, cryptocurrency wallet material, and other high-value secrets.
Runner scripts inside the Bissa scanner framework were hardcoded with a Telegram bot token linked to a bot called @bissapwned_bot. Every time the scanner confirmed a successful React2Shell exploit, the bot sent a structured alert directly to the attacker’s private Telegram chat.
5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.