Skip to main content
Mallory
MalwareUsed by 1 actor

SSLORDoor

SSLORDoor is a C++ backdoor associated with the China-aligned GopherWhisper threat group. ESET reported it as part of GopherWhisper’s malware arsenal used in intrusions targeting Mongolian governmental institutions, with the broader campaign assessed to have affected about 12 systems in one Mongolian government entity and potentially dozens of additional victims. Unlike most of the group’s Go-based tooling, SSLORDoor is written in C++.

The malware communicates directly with operators over raw TCP sockets on port 443 using OpenSSL BIO and TLS rather than standard HTTPS. Reported functionality includes host and drive enumeration, spawning a hidden cmd.exe for command execution, file operations including read, write, delete, and upload, and creation of proxy socket connections. ESET also reported that SSLORDoor encrypts C2 traffic by XORing bytes with 0x3F and then applying an obfuscated RC4 routine using the key lsk2ksi9f before sending data through TLS.

Observed sample information includes delltool.exe, detected as Win64/Agent.AGD and described as an SSLORDoor backdoor. A reported SSLORDoor command-and-control server is 43.231.113[.]50, hosted by Intelligent Tools and first seen on 2025-03-24.

Share:
For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
GopherWhisper

We also unearthed two other backdoors: RatGopher and SSLORDoor. RatGopher leverages Discord for communication with the operators. SSLORDoor, unlike the rest of the tools that we had discovered at that point, was not written in Go but in C++.

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3
TacticExecution

LaxGopher has the following capabilities: interactively execute commands via cmd.exe... RatGopher has the following capabilities: execute a new instance of cmd.exe... SSLORDoor has the following capabilities: spawn a hidden cmd.exe.

T1106Native APIEvidence2
TacticExecution

JabGopher and SSLORDoor use API calls during execution.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2
TacticStealth

CompactGopher runs its own cleanup process by deleting both the cleartext and encrypted archives... BoxOfFriends selfdelete... the file used in the injection process will be deleted.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

JabGopher, LaxGopher, CompactGopher, RatGopher, and SSLORDoor all have encryption/decryption capabilities.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1007System Service DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

LaxGopher, RatGopher, and SSLORDoor can enumerate all services running on a compromised host.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

LaxGopher, RatGopher, and SSLORDoor can collect the hostname, OS version, and OS architecture of a compromised host.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence4
TacticDiscovery

LaxGopher, RatGopher, and SSLORDoor can obtain file and directory listings.

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

SSLORDoor – C++ backdoor using OpenSSL BIO over raw sockets (port 443), capable of executing commands and performing file operations (read, write, delete, upload) and drive enumeration.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

LaxGopher, RatGopher, and SSLORDoor can identify running software on victim machines.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

LaxGopher, RatGopher, SSLORDoor, and CompactGopher can collect local data from a compromised machine.

Command and Control

10 techniques
T1001.003Protocol or Service ImpersonationEvidence2

SSLORDoor can send a raw encrypted byte stream via the default HTTPS port.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

SSLORDoor communicates directly with the operators over an encrypted channel on port 443. | Attackers continue to lean on everyday collaboration platforms to hide command and control traffic inside normal enterprise noise... running its operations through Slack workspaces, Discord servers, Outlook drafts, and the file.io sharing service.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

SSLORDoor communicates directly with the operators over an encrypted channel on port 443.

T1090ProxyEvidence2

Command 21: Creates a connection to a new socket as a proxy, where bytes are read through recv and processed onto the stack as C&C messages.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

SSLORDoor: a backdoor built in C++ that uses OpenSSL BIO for communication via raw sockets on port 443.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

LaxGopher, RatGopher, and SSLORDoor can all download additional files/payloads.

T1132.002Non-Standard EncodingEvidence2

SSLORDoor leverages custom data encoding to communicate with the C&C. BoxOfFriends uses base58 and base64 encoding.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

Also used by the threat actor is ... a C++ backdoor that offers remote control over compromised hosts.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence2

LaxGopher and RatGopher use AES algorithms for encryption. BoxOfFriends uses XOR encryption.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence2

SSLORDoor uses TLS encryption for C&C communication.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

LaxGopher, RatGopher, SSLORDoor, and BoxOfFriends exfiltrate data to their C&Cs.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
2 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching3

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping21

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.