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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

RatGopher

RatGopher is a Go-based backdoor used in the GopherWhisper intrusion set. It uses the Discord API via the discordgo library to communicate with a private Discord server for command and control, receiving commands from a configured channel and posting execution results back to that channel. Reported capabilities include executing commands through cmd.exe, uploading files to and downloading files from file.io, and a kill command. Multiple sources state that it uses AES-128 in CFB and CBC modes, with support for operator-driven CBC key and IV rotation through specially formatted Discord messages. One reported initialization message is "Hello, everyone!\nI'm coming!". RatGopher has been associated with the China-aligned threat actor GopherWhisper, which ESET observed targeting governmental institutions in Mongolia, including roughly 12 compromised systems in one Mongolian government entity, with indications of additional victims. The malware is part of a broader GopherWhisper toolset that also includes LaxGopher, BoxOfFriends, CompactGopher, JabGopher, FriendDelivery, and SSLORDoor. Reported sample metadata includes intelservice.exe, detected as WinGo/Agent.VM, described as a RatGopher backdoor using Discord for C2. The content also states that GopherWhisper used a stolen Google LLC code-signing certificate to sign RatGopher.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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GopherWhisper

We also unearthed two other backdoors: RatGopher and SSLORDoor. RatGopher leverages Discord for communication with the operators.

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence2

GopherWhisper uses Slack, Discord, and Microsoft Graph services for its C&C infrastructure.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

RatGopher and early versions of its source code were identified from chat log analysis. BoxOfFriends is a custom backdoor.

T1588.003Code Signing CertificatesEvidence2

GopherWhisper has used stolen Google LLC code-signing certificates to sign RatGopher.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1
TacticExecution

LaxGopher communicates via Slack, runs commands, and downloads payloads

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

LaxGopher has the following capabilities: interactively execute commands via cmd.exe... RatGopher has the following capabilities: execute a new instance of cmd.exe... SSLORDoor has the following capabilities: spawn a hidden cmd.exe.

Stealth

1 technique
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

JabGopher, LaxGopher, CompactGopher, RatGopher, and SSLORDoor all have encryption/decryption capabilities.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1007System Service DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

LaxGopher, RatGopher, and SSLORDoor can enumerate all services running on a compromised host.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

LaxGopher, RatGopher, and SSLORDoor can collect the hostname, OS version, and OS architecture of a compromised host.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

LaxGopher, RatGopher, and SSLORDoor can obtain file and directory listings.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

LaxGopher, RatGopher, and SSLORDoor can identify running software on victim machines.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

LaxGopher, RatGopher, SSLORDoor, and CompactGopher can collect local data from a compromised machine.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence8

Attackers continue to lean on everyday collaboration platforms to hide command and control traffic inside normal enterprise noise... running its operations through Slack workspaces, Discord servers, Outlook drafts, and the file.io sharing service.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence4

RatGopher backdoor that uses Discord for C&C.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence4

The blog post on GopherWhisper’s toolset including backdoors abusing publicly available services like Slack, Discord, and Microsoft Graph

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence2

LaxGopher, RatGopher, and BoxOfFriends use Slack, Discord, and Microsoft Graph, respectively, for C&C infrastructure.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

LaxGopher, RatGopher, and SSLORDoor can all download additional files/payloads.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

LaxGopher and RatGopher use base64 to encode messages sent to their C&Cs.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence2

LaxGopher and RatGopher use AES algorithms for encryption. BoxOfFriends uses XOR encryption.

Exfiltration

3 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

LaxGopher, RatGopher, SSLORDoor, and BoxOfFriends exfiltrate data to their C&Cs.

T1048.002Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence2

RatGopher and CompactGopher use HTTPS to exfiltrate data collected from victims to file.io.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence3

LaxGopher leverages Slack to exfiltrate data. RatGopher leverages Discord and file.io to exfiltrate data. CompactGopher uses the file.io web service to exfiltrate data.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching2

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping21

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.