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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 1 actor

SNOWBELT

SNOWBELT is a malicious Chromium browser extension and JavaScript-based backdoor used in the SNOW malware ecosystem. It is associated with threat cluster UNC6692 and has been deployed in social-engineering campaigns that used email bombing and Microsoft Teams helpdesk impersonation to trick victims into installing a fake mailbox repair or spam-fix utility. The infection chain described in the reporting involves a dropper that downloads and executes AutoHotkey binaries and scripts, performs initial reconnaissance, and installs SNOWBELT on Microsoft Edge, including via headless mode with the "--load-extension" switch. SNOWBELT was not distributed through the Chrome Web Store and instead was delivered through social engineering. It often masquerades as "MS Heartbeat" or "System Heartbeat." SNOWBELT provides an initial foothold and persistence through the browser extension registration system, and reporting also states it maintained persistence via a Windows Startup folder shortcut, scheduled tasks, and a headless Edge process. Its capabilities include acting as a backdoor, harvesting saved credentials and session cookies, maintaining access to corporate accounts, and relaying attacker commands to additional malware components. UNC6692 used SNOWBELT to download further payloads including SNOWGLAZE, a Python-based WebSocket tunneler, SNOWBASIN, a Python backdoor/bindshell, additional AutoHotkey scripts, and a portable Python environment. Reported follow-on activity in the same intrusion set included internal reconnaissance, port scanning, lateral movement, LSASS memory extraction, Pass-the-Hash, and exfiltration of sensitive data. High-confidence indicators and artifacts mentioned in the content include the masquerade names "MS Heartbeat" and "System Heartbeat," use of AWS S3-hosted delivery infrastructure, and related campaign infrastructure such as wss://sad4w7h913-b4a57f9c36eb.herokuapp.com/ws and S3 domains including service-page-25144-30466-outlook.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com, cloudfront-021.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com, and service-page-11369-28315-outlook.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UNC6692

The first stage downloads an AutoHotKey binary and an AutoHotkey script, which immediately starts performing reconnaissance and installs a malicious Chromium browser extension called SnowBelt. ... SnowBelt, a JavaScript-based backdoor delivered as a Chromium browser extension, gives the attacker an initial foothold and maintains persistence via the browser's extension registration system. It often hides behind names like "MS Heartbeat" or "System Heartbeat."

via register securitytheregister.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence1

its systematic abuse of legitimate cloud services for every stage of the attack payload delivery, credential exfiltration, C2 infrastructure, and data staging, all of which relied on trusted platforms like AWS S3 and Heroku.

Initial Access

6 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

SnowBelt functions as a backdoor that allows attackers to maintain access to corporate accounts and move through internal systems without repeated authentication.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

The hacker sends a link to a fake “Mailbox Repair” utility or asks the victim to open remote access tools like Quick Assist. Either way, they install the SNOW malware suite.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Once it's clicked, it leads to the download of an AutoHotkey script from a threat actor-controlled AWS S3 bucket.

T1566PhishingEvidence6

Step 2 — The helper arrives on Teams Right away, an external Microsoft Teams account named “IT Helpdesk” messages the victim. The hacker offers to fix the email issue immediately.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The fake helpdesk worker prompts the user to click a link that supposedly installs a local patch that prevents email spamming. This directs victims to a landing page masquerading as a 'Mailbox Repair Utility'...

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence3

Step 2 — The helper arrives on Teams Right away, an external Microsoft Teams account named “IT Helpdesk” messages the victim. The hacker offers to fix the email issue immediately.

Execution

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

SNOWBELT maintained persistence through a Windows Startup folder shortcut, two scheduled tasks, and a headless Microsoft Edge process silently loading the extension.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The extension executes on a headless Microsoft Edge instance, so the victim doesn’t notice anything, while scheduled tasks and a startup folder shortcut are also created for persistence.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

The first stage downloads an AutoHotKey binary and an AutoHotkey script, which immediately starts performing reconnaissance... SnowGlaze is a Python-based tunneler... Finally, SnowBasin is a Python bindshell...

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

...to trick victims into installing a fake fix for email issues. The attack delivered AutoHotKey-based loaders...

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Once it's clicked, it leads to the download of an AutoHotkey script from a threat actor-controlled AWS S3 bucket.

Persistence

7 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

SNOWBELT maintained persistence through a Windows Startup folder shortcut, two scheduled tasks, and a headless Microsoft Edge process silently loading the extension.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The extension executes on a headless Microsoft Edge instance, so the victim doesn’t notice anything, while scheduled tasks and a startup folder shortcut are also created for persistence.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

SnowBelt functions as a backdoor that allows attackers to maintain access to corporate accounts and move through internal systems without repeated authentication.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

The hacker sends a link to a fake “Mailbox Repair” utility or asks the victim to open remote access tools like Quick Assist. Either way, they install the SNOW malware suite.

T1176Software ExtensionsEvidence6

The first stage downloads an AutoHotKey binary and an AutoHotkey script, which immediately starts performing reconnaissance and installs a malicious Chromium browser extension called SnowBelt. | SnowBelt, a JavaScript-based backdoor delivered as a Chromium browser extension, gives the attacker an initial foothold and maintains persistence via the browser's extension registration system.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

SNOWBELT maintained persistence through a Windows Startup folder shortcut

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The extension executes on a headless Microsoft Edge instance, so the victim doesn’t notice anything, while scheduled tasks and a startup folder shortcut are also created for persistence.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

SNOWBELT maintained persistence through a Windows Startup folder shortcut, two scheduled tasks, and a headless Microsoft Edge process silently loading the extension.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The extension executes on a headless Microsoft Edge instance, so the victim doesn’t notice anything, while scheduled tasks and a startup folder shortcut are also created for persistence.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

SnowBelt functions as a backdoor that allows attackers to maintain access to corporate accounts and move through internal systems without repeated authentication.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

SNOWBELT maintained persistence through a Windows Startup folder shortcut

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The extension executes on a headless Microsoft Edge instance, so the victim doesn’t notice anything, while scheduled tasks and a startup folder shortcut are also created for persistence.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

This directs victims to a landing page masquerading as a 'Mailbox Repair Utility'... SnowBelt... often hides behind names like 'MS Heartbeat' or 'System Heartbeat.'

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

SnowBelt functions as a backdoor that allows attackers to maintain access to corporate accounts and move through internal systems without repeated authentication.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The attacker used a gatekeeper script designed to ensure the payload is delivered only to intended targets while evading automated security sandboxes... The script also checks the victim's browser.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

SNOWBELT is a malicious Chromium browser extension that acts as a backdoor, harvesting saved credentials and session cookies.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

SNOWBELT is a malicious Chromium browser extension that acts as a backdoor, harvesting saved credentials and session cookies.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Attacker commands (such as whoami or net user) are sent through the SnowGlaze tunnel...

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

After gaining initial access, process execution telemetry recorded UNC6692 using a Python script to scan the local network for ports 135, 445, and 3389.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The first stage downloads an AutoHotKey binary and an AutoHotkey script, which immediately starts performing reconnaissance...

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The attacker used a gatekeeper script designed to ensure the payload is delivered only to intended targets while evading automated security sandboxes... The script also checks the victim's browser.

Collection

1 technique
T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

SNOWBELT is a malicious Chromium browser extension that acts as a backdoor, harvesting saved credentials and session cookies.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

SNOWGLAZE masked malicious traffic by wrapping data in Base64-encoded JSON objects over WebSockets, making it appear as standard encrypted web traffic.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

Once installed, the extension can download additional components, including malware tools dubbed SnowGlaze and SnowBasin, along with AutoHotkey scripts and a portable Python environment used to run further malicious code.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Hashes
6 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

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ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

10 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching6

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping25

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.