Loading malware…
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
if ( RegOpenKeyExA (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, SubKey, 0 , KEY_ALL_ACCESS, &phkResult) ) ... reg_query_value (phkResult, aProcessornames, 0 , &Type, Data, &cbData);
Notably, the custom TCP protocol employs a straightforward encryption algorithm, using XOR and addition with a one-byte key, to encrypt the TCP packet's payload.
The malware utilizes two communication channels: one via the HTTP protocol and the other through a custom TCP packet payload.
6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Malware that encrypts its command-and-control traffic over TCP using a custom encryption algorithm and a fixed key.
A 32-bit DLL written in C that communicates with its C2 over both HTTP and a custom TCP protocol. It builds a 296-byte encrypted check-in packet containing host profiling data such as processor name, RAM, OS version, language ID, and a server address, using a simple XOR-plus-addition one-byte key encryption scheme.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.