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Mallory
Malware

DollRAT

Tracked since Apr 25, 2026 · Updated 7 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK23Techniques
IOCs15Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

[Persistence] └─→ Scheduled task: schtasks /create /tn "<name>" /sc ONLOGON /rl HIGHEST /f

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Remote Shell cmd.exe sessions ( /k START "" "<path>" & EXIT )

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

[Persistence] └─→ Scheduled task: schtasks /create /tn "<name>" /sc ONLOGON /rl HIGHEST /f

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

[Persistence] └─→ Registry Run key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

[Persistence] └─→ Scheduled task: schtasks /create /tn "<name>" /sc ONLOGON /rl HIGHEST /f

T1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs ... T1134.001 Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Elevation via runas

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

[Persistence] └─→ Registry Run key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

Elevation UAC bypass attempts via runas verb

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

The binary is protected with ConfuserEx ... Name Obfuscation ... String Protection

T1027.005Indicator Removal from ToolsEvidence1

String Protection : C2 host, port, mutex, installation path, and other configuration strings are encrypted ... The C2 host/port cannot be extracted statically

T1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs ... T1134.001 Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Elevation via runas

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Keylogger Hook type: Global Windows keyboard hook via Gma.System.MouseKeyHook

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

FTP/SFTP Clients: FileZilla: {AppData}\FileZilla\recentservers.xml , sitemanager.xml WinSCP: SOFTWARE\\Martin Prikryl\\WinSCP 2\\Sessions (registry)

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

Browser credential dump ... Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Opera, Brave, Yandex, IE

Discovery

7 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

Registry Editor Full HKLM/HKCU/HKCR/HKU/HKCC registry access

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

Data reported to C2: ... MAC Address, LAN IP, WAN IP, ASN, ISP

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Data reported to C2: Username, PC Name, Domain Name, Host Name

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

Process Manager List/kill processes, launch new processes

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

On first connection, the client gathers: WMI queries: SELECT * FROM Win32_OperatingSystem ... SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor ... SELECT * FROM Win32_BIOS

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

File Manager Upload, download, delete, rename files/directories

T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence1

IP geolocation APIs: https://ipwho.is/ — returns hostname, country, country_code, continent_code, timezone

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Keylogger Hook type: Global Windows keyboard hook via Gma.System.MouseKeyHook

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Remote Desktop Screen capture and streaming

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

Remote Control Features ... Reverse Proxy TCP tunneling through victim machine

T1090.004Domain FrontingEvidence1

T1090.004 Proxy Domain Fronting ngrok tunnel hides true C2 destination

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

Connected to 0.tcp.eu.ngrok.io on port 18107

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

[C2 Beaconing] └─→ RSA-2048 key exchange using embedded public key └─→ AES-256 encrypted channel established

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

[Exfiltration] └─→ All collected data sent over AES-256 encrypted channel to ngrok C2

Indicators of compromise

Observables

15 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching15Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping23Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.