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Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

FDMTP

Tracked since Apr 25, 2026 · Updated 19 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK28Techniques
IOCs111Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ReconnaissanceExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionDLL sideloading
Delivery
USB
Platforms
Windows

FDMTP is a Windows malware downloader and modular backdoor associated with the Chinese state-sponsored espionage actor Mustang Panda, also known as Earth Preta and Twill Typhoon. Implemented using .NET and the TouchSocket networking library, it communicates using Duplex Message Transport Protocol (DMTP). Initially identified as a secondary control tool deployed by PUBLOAD, it has been used in operations targeting government-related organizations in the Asia-Pacific region.

FDMTP supports payload retrieval, remote tasking, and server-supplied plugins that extend its functionality after deployment. It collects operating system and network information, usernames, running processes, installed antivirus products, runtime details, and active window information, and transmits collected host information to command-and-control infrastructure. Its modular functionality includes scheduled-task management and Registry-based persistence. Implants register with staging infrastructure to obtain command-and-control cluster information. Observed execution chains use DLL sideloading through legitimate Windows applications, encrypted payloads, and in-memory .NET loading. Earlier variants protect embedded network configuration with Base64 encoding and DES encryption.

Deployment routes include PUBLOAD infections originating from HIUPAN propagation through removable drives and a software supply-chain compromise involving trojanized QuickFox Windows installers active since at least August 2025. In the QuickFox chain, modified Electron application code retrieves a JavaScript loader that profiles endpoints and applies targeting checks before downloading components that sideload FDMTP. Although FDMTP has an established association with Mustang Panda, the QuickFox campaign was not definitively attributed to that actor.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2026-120422via cryptika blogExploited in the wildSogou Input Method Configuration Hijacking Leading to Code ExecutionSome of Sogou’s background requests travel over plain HTTP instead of secure HTTPS, so the attackers tampered with DNS ... Tencent, which owns Sogou, fixed the weakness in version 16.10, and the issue now has the ID CVE-2026-120422.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Mustang Panda

FDMTP is a newly found hacktool used by Earth Preta. It is a simple malware downloader implemented based on TouchSocket over Duplex Message Transport Protocol (DMTP).

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

multiple hosts began in September 2025 making requests to spoofed domains impersonating content delivery networks, including infrastructure putatively belonging to Yahoo and Apple.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence7

FortiGuard Labs has uncovered a long-running supply chain compromise targeting QuickFox, a Windows VPN/network acceleration application primarily used by overseas Chinese users. Attackers tampered with official Windows installers to deploy a custom backdoor tracked as FDMTP

T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence2

SlippyNunchucks cible des individus sinophones au Sri Lanka via le détournement des mises à jour de QuickFox pour déployer le toolset DarkVigil (aka FDMTP) ; DeceptiveDevelopment remonte la chaîne d’approvisionnement logicielle : vol de credentials Git/SSH, injection de code malveillant dans des dépôts publics/privés

T1659Content InjectionEvidence1

SlippyNunchucks injected a malicious configuration into Sogou Input Method’s network communication via DNS hijacking.

Execution

7 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

The malware can also manage scheduled tasks and Registry persistence.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

Attackers tampered with official Windows installers to deploy a custom backdoor tracked as FDMTP, enabling selective victim profiling and post-compromise access.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

The group is known for its use of a .NET malware downloader known as FDMTP.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence3

The attack begins with a modified Electron renderer HTML file that downloads and executes a JavaScript loader.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The attack... involves a trojanized version of the application used to deliver FDMTP... The malicious code was embedded in QuickFox's Windows installer

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Attackers modified an Electron renderer HTML file to download and execute a JavaScript-based loader.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

The disguised biz_helper.exe then side-loads the malicious \Components\libcef.dll, resulting in execution of the DarkVigil implant.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

The malware can also manage scheduled tasks and Registry persistence.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The server invokes the RegistryPlugin method, which stores the plugin’s compressed binary in the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\IME\<HWID>\pluginHash.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The malware can also manage scheduled tasks and Registry persistence.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

The malware can also manage scheduled tasks and Registry persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The malware can also manage scheduled tasks and Registry persistence.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

Those lines pulled script files from cdns3[.]51quickfox[.]cn , a domain that resembles QuickFox infrastructure but is not the official 51quickfox[.]com domain.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

The malicious configuration instructs SGTool.exe to save the legitimate Adobe binary (biz_helper.exe) as \Components\SogouComMgr.exe.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

This loader identifies valid Windows targets before installing the FDMTP implant. The loader checks for specific processes, such as Steam, and a list of 26 domestic applications, cryptocurrency wallets, and developer tools, before downloading the next stage payload.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Attackers modified an Electron renderer HTML file to download and execute a JavaScript-based loader.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

The disguised biz_helper.exe then side-loads the malicious \Components\libcef.dll, resulting in execution of the DarkVigil implant.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The server invokes the RegistryPlugin method, which stores the plugin’s compressed binary in the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\IME\<HWID>\pluginHash.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

In the victims’ environments, the DNS resolution of config.pinyin.sogou[.]com was controlled by the attacker who resolved it to one of their staging servers.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1010Application Window DiscoveryEvidence1

FDMTP gathers system information, including active programs

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

FDMTP gathers system information, including active programs, antivirus software, and network details

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence2

FDMTP gathers system information, including active programs, antivirus software, and network details

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

The JavaScript checked that the endpoint was Windows, queried command output such as process listings, and used guardrails before the later stages downloaded and ran the implant.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence4

the trojanized QuickFox installer fingerprints each system and deploys the FDMTP backdoor only when attacker-defined criteria are met

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

This loader identifies valid Windows targets before installing the FDMTP implant. The loader checks for specific processes, such as Steam, and a list of 26 domestic applications, cryptocurrency wallets, and developer tools, before downloading the next stage payload.

Collection

2 techniques
T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

In the victims’ environments, the DNS resolution of config.pinyin.sogou[.]com was controlled by the attacker who resolved it to one of their staging servers.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

This payload, delivered via a ZIP archive, uses DLL side-loading to deploy FDMTP.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

Researchers observed ongoing infrastructure activity, indicating the campaign is still under active development.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

DarkVigil uses HTTP to connect to its bootstrap server.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence8

The malicious configuration instructs a Sogou Input Method component to download DarkVigil. DarkVigil can download additional plugins from the C&C server.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

DarkVigil uses encrypted messages to communicate with its C&C server.

T1659Content InjectionEvidence1

SlippyNunchucks injected a malicious configuration into Sogou Input Method’s network communication via DNS hijacking.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

DarkVigil can use DMTP to exfiltrate data to its C&C server.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

111 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

15 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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darktrace blogNews · Aug 25, 2026Why Trust is the New Attack Surface: Mid-Year Threat Update 2026A backdoor associated in the referenced material with Chinese-nexus intrusion tradecraft and long-term access operations.Read more ↗fortinet outbreak alertsNews · Aug 7, 2026QuickFox Supply Chain Attack | Outbreak Alert | FortiGuard LabsA custom backdoor delivered via trojanized QuickFox Windows installers in a software supply-chain compromise. It is selectively deployed after system fingerprinting, suggesting a targeted espionage-oriented operation that enables victim profiling and post-compromise access.Read more ↗scworldNews · Aug 5, 2026QuickFox VPN targeted in long-standing supply chain attack delivering FDMTP backdoor | brief | SC MediaA backdoor delivered via a trojanized QuickFox Windows installer. After target validation by a JavaScript loader, it is deployed using DLL side-loading from a ZIP archive. It collects system information such as active programs, antivirus software, and network details, exfiltrates the data to a command-and-control server, and can manage scheduled tasks and Registry persistence.Read more ↗trojan killer newsNews · Aug 5, 2026QuickFox FDMTP Backdoor: Trojanized Windows Installer ChecksA backdoor/implant delivered via a trojanized QuickFox Windows installer. The infection chain used modified Electron-loaded HTML and downloaded JavaScript to profile Windows systems, then later loaders sideloaded the implant using csmonitor.exe and a malicious Microsoft.ServiceHosting.Tools.dll. The implant registered the endpoint with staging infrastructure, received cluster nodes, and supported plugin-style modules for remote operations and persistent access.Read more ↗
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IOC matching111Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping28Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.