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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

httpMalice

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Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Kimsuky

The group is also deploying new malware families like HelloDoor and HttpMalice, variants of PebbleDash, and enhanced versions of AppleSeed, such as HappyDoor, which focuses on data exfiltration and GPKI certificate extraction.

via scworldscworld.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

Kimsuky obtains initial access to target systems by delivering spear-phishing emails containing malicious attachments disguised as documents.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1
TacticExecution

HTTPSpy is a full-featured remote access trojan that supports a wide range of capabilities to run shell commands, upload/download files, execute processes, capture screenshots, inject DLL paths into specified PID processes, and erase itself from the endpoint.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

The malicious payload leverages powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden certutil -decode [src path] [dst path] for the second Base64 decoding before execution.

T1106Native APIEvidence1
TacticExecution

HttpMalice, the latest backdoor variant of PebbleDash, emerged no later than December 2025. It comes with capabilities to gather information about the compromised system, set up persistence, perform reconnaissance using native Windows commands.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

Kimsuky meticulously crafts and delivers spear-phishing emails to its targets in an attempt to entice them into opening attachments.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

If the token is elevated, a service named CacheDB is created...

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

HelloDoor establishes persistence upon execution by registering itself to the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key...

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

If the token is elevated, a service named CacheDB is created...

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

HelloDoor establishes persistence upon execution by registering itself to the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key...

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

Reger Dropper (.SCR) and Pidoc Dropper (.PIF) also contain benign lure files and malicious payloads that, in both cases, are encrypted using XOR operations... Pidoc Dropper is fully obfuscated using dummy data and encrypted strings.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

These attachments often consist of compressed files containing droppers in formats such as .JSE, .EXE, .PIF, or .SCR. The filenames are consistent with the message content and are meant to convince the recipient to open the attachment.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1
TacticStealth

Ultimately, the malicious payload is executed via command-line instructions such as ... rundll32.exe [file path] [export function] .

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1
TacticStealth

HttpMalice, the latest backdoor variant of PebbleDash, emerged no later than December 2025. It comes with capabilities to gather information about the compromised system, set up persistence, perform reconnaissance using native Windows commands, capture screenshots, load downloaded payloads into memory, run commands, and exfiltrate the execution output.

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

HttpMalice, the latest backdoor variant of PebbleDash, emerged no later than December 2025. It comes with capabilities to gather information about the compromised system.

Collection

2 techniques
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

HTTPSpy is a full-featured remote access trojan that supports a wide range of capabilities to run shell commands, upload/download files, execute processes, capture screenshots, inject DLL paths into specified PID processes, and erase itself from the endpoint.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Upload a directory to the C2 server after it has been archived

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The implant communicates with the C2 server ... over the HTTP protocol.

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence1

version 1.8 uses Dropbox. The latter, the older variant, leverages the Dropbox API by utilizing pre-defined application credentials.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The DLL establishes persistence on the host using a scheduled task and contacts a command-and-control (C2) server to retrieve an as-yet-unknown payload.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

HttpMalice, the latest backdoor variant of PebbleDash, emerged no later than December 2025. It comes with capabilities to gather information about the compromised system, set up persistence, perform reconnaissance using native Windows commands, capture screenshots, load downloaded payloads into memory, run commands, and exfiltrate the execution output.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
2 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
3 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
2 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app16 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app16 days ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app16 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app16 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 months ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching7

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping18

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.