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MalwareUsed by 3 actors

trojan.leopard/bitsuh

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For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UAC-0184

The LNK fleet extends beyond the three publicly-named lures with VT-attested Mar–Apr 2026 siblings labelled trojan.leopard/bitsuh ... MALWARE trojan.leopard/bitsuh

via github gist webgist.github.com
MB-0007

The LNK fleet extends beyond the three publicly-named lures with VT-attested Mar–Apr 2026 siblings labelled trojan.leopard/bitsuh ... MALWARE trojan.leopard/bitsuh

via github gist webgist.github.com
UNC5435

The LNK fleet extends beyond the three publicly-named lures with VT-attested Mar–Apr 2026 siblings labelled trojan.leopard/bitsuh ... MALWARE trojan.leopard/bitsuh

via github gist webgist.github.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

T1566.001 — Spearphishing Attachment ( .lnk Cyrillic-themed lures)

Execution

6 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

T1053.005 — Scheduled Task

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2
TacticExecution

T1059.001 — PowerShell ( -ExecutionPolicy UnRestricted launcher of the AES blob)

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2
TacticExecution

T1059.005 — Visual Basic (HTA-embedded VBScript Execute chr(N-(&Hx)) )

T1197BITS JobsEvidence2

T1197 — BITS Jobs ( bitsadmin /transfer )

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2
TacticExecution

T1204.002 — User Execution: Malicious File

T1574.001DLLEvidence2

T1574.001 — DLL Search Order Hijacking (search-order variant on Bitdefender path)

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

T1053.005 — Scheduled Task

T1197BITS JobsEvidence2

T1197 — BITS Jobs ( bitsadmin /transfer )

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

T1547.001 — Registry Run Keys

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

T1053.005 — Scheduled Task

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

T1055 — Process Injection / Process Hollowing

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

T1547.001 — Registry Run Keys

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

T1027 — Obfuscated Files or Information (decoy- <table> padding, chr-chain, gzip)

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence2
TacticStealth

T1036.005 — Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name (Plane9 visualizer, Bitdefender deployer covers)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

T1055 — Process Injection / Process Hollowing

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

T1140 — Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information ( $hCYip AES key + gunzip)

T1197BITS JobsEvidence2

T1197 — BITS Jobs ( bitsadmin /transfer )

T1218.005MshtaEvidence2
TacticStealth

T1218.005 — Mshta ( mshta.exe %TEMP%\~tmp.hta )

T1574.001DLLEvidence2

T1574.001 — DLL Search Order Hijacking (search-order variant on Bitdefender path)

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2
TacticStealth

T1620 — Reflective Code Loading (.NET assembly via Assembly.Load )

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence2

T1090.001 — Internal Proxy (multicast UDP 224.0.0.255:31339 + TCP :31339 )

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

T1105 — Ingress Tool Transfer ( bitsadmin fetch of HTA + ZIP)

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence2

T1573.001 — Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography (AES-256-CBC null IV)

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

15 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
8 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
7 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app16 days ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app18 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app18 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app18 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app18 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app18 days ago
ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.

No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching15

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping17

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.