JOMANGY
- Type
- Webshell
- Capabilities
- Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
- Platforms
- Linux
JOMANGY is a PHP webshell used by the financially motivated INJ3CTOR3 threat actor in campaigns against Linux-based, Asterisk-powered telephone systems, particularly FreePBX. Its primary purpose is VoIP toll fraud: attackers execute remote commands, access telephone-system functions, and route unauthorized calls through victims’ SIP trunks at the victims’ expense. Its password-protected panel can forge FreePBX administrator sessions without requiring the legitimate administrator password. Campaigns deploy it on internet-exposed PBX servers through exploitation of vulnerable systems.
JOMANGY deployments use six interlocking persistence channels, including recurring scheduled tasks, shell-login and boot triggers, protected task backups, process watchdogs, multiple webshell copies, and a privileged PHP executor. Surviving components can restore deleted payloads, including through locally cached installers when external infrastructure is unavailable. Associated takeover scripts establish privileged operating-system and application accounts, remove competing implants, and alter firewall rules. Defense-evasion techniques include layered Base64 and ROT13 encoding, timestamp manipulation, immutable or append-only file attributes, log and command-history deletion, and web-server rewrite rules that conceal the webshell’s actual location in access logs.
Updated deployment components are configured to repeatedly upload 17 configuration files associated with FreePBX, Issabel, Elastix, Asterisk, and Postfix to attacker-controlled infrastructure. These files can expose SIP and PJSIP authentication secrets, Asterisk Manager Interface credentials, database passwords, and mail-relay credentials. Scheduled execution enables credential-upload attempts every minute. Stolen trunk credentials can support fraudulent calling from attacker-controlled systems even after the original PBX is rebuilt, unless carrier-side controls prevent their reuse.
Associated vulnerabilities
2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
INJ3CTOR3 has upgraded its FreePBX toll-fraud campaign by adding credential theft to its existing JOMANGY webshell.
Techniques & procedures
21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
Ultimately, the FreePBX exploitation campaign relies on known security loopholes for initial access. Forensics point to two high-confidence flaws tracked as CVE-2025-64328 and CVE-2025-57819.
Execution
4 techniques
Execution
Minute-level beacons, a restore line and a watchdog.
CVE-2025-64328 is a post-authentication command injection flaw in the FreePBX filestore module
/x and k.php run as bash scripts fetched by cron.
The sixth is a PHP executor in the FreePBX high-availability module providing privileged command execution independently of all other channels.
Persistence
6 techniques
Persistence
The second fires a re-infection payload on every root login and system reboot by injecting code into shell profile files.
Specifically, the threat actor establishes six independent survival channels on infected devices. These tracks include ... shell profile insertion ...
Minute-level beacons, a restore line and a watchdog.
The infection also quietly drops 18 backdoor accounts across three tiers. Nine carry full root-equivalent privileges, eight operate at the service account level, and one is injected into the FreePBX web panel database via MySQL.
Backdoor Account newfpbx, newfpbxs, xhimax UID-0 OS backdoor accounts created via base64-obfuscated useradd commands
JOMANGY and ZenharR, 12 copies across the web root.
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
Privilege Escalation
The second fires a re-infection payload on every root login and system reboot by injecting code into shell profile files.
Specifically, the threat actor establishes six independent survival channels on infected devices. These tracks include ... shell profile insertion ...
Minute-level beacons, a restore line and a watchdog.
Stealth
4 techniques
Stealth
base64, base64 and ROT13 layers around the webshell; base64 cron payloads.
When it executes, it aggressively cleanses the environment of other cybercriminals. For example, the payload scans for fifty distinct third-party webshell signatures. It deletes competing files... Concurrently, the code performs a self-eviction routine against its own older campaign files.
touch -r copies footer.php’s timestamp onto the webshell.
The third stores eight immutable crontab copies in hidden directories
Defense Impairment
3 techniques
Defense Impairment
The third stores eight immutable crontab copies in hidden directories, protected by a file attribute that silently blocks deletion even by root
chattr +i and +a on webshells and crontab spares.
It deletes competing files and blocks eleven adversary control servers bidirectionally.
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
The fourth is a process watchdog that immediately re-downloads the dropper if the beacon processes disappear.
For example, the payload scans for fifty distinct third-party webshell signatures.
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
The first channel polls the attacker’s command-and-control server every one to three minutes via scheduled cron jobs
Impact
1 technique
Impact
Victim’s PBX and trunks used to place premium-rate calls.
Observables
29 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.