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Malware1 associated actor2 associated CVEs

JOMANGY

Tracked since May 22, 2026 · Updated 20 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days7 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns2Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK21Techniques
IOCs29Tracked
Type
Webshell
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
Linux

JOMANGY is a PHP webshell used by the financially motivated INJ3CTOR3 threat actor in campaigns against Linux-based, Asterisk-powered telephone systems, particularly FreePBX. Its primary purpose is VoIP toll fraud: attackers execute remote commands, access telephone-system functions, and route unauthorized calls through victims’ SIP trunks at the victims’ expense. Its password-protected panel can forge FreePBX administrator sessions without requiring the legitimate administrator password. Campaigns deploy it on internet-exposed PBX servers through exploitation of vulnerable systems.

JOMANGY deployments use six interlocking persistence channels, including recurring scheduled tasks, shell-login and boot triggers, protected task backups, process watchdogs, multiple webshell copies, and a privileged PHP executor. Surviving components can restore deleted payloads, including through locally cached installers when external infrastructure is unavailable. Associated takeover scripts establish privileged operating-system and application accounts, remove competing implants, and alter firewall rules. Defense-evasion techniques include layered Base64 and ROT13 encoding, timestamp manipulation, immutable or append-only file attributes, log and command-history deletion, and web-server rewrite rules that conceal the webshell’s actual location in access logs.

Updated deployment components are configured to repeatedly upload 17 configuration files associated with FreePBX, Issabel, Elastix, Asterisk, and Postfix to attacker-controlled infrastructure. These files can expose SIP and PJSIP authentication secrets, Asterisk Manager Interface credentials, database passwords, and mail-relay credentials. Scheduled execution enables credential-upload attempts every minute. Stolen trunk credentials can support fraudulent calling from attacker-controlled systems even after the original PBX is rebuilt, unless carrier-side controls prevent their reuse.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-64328via security online infoExploited in the wildAuthenticated Command Injection in Sangoma FreePBX FilestoreForensics point to two high-confidence flaws tracked as CVE-2025-64328 and CVE-2025-57819. Many systems remain exposed because administrators fail to apply patches promptly. | Analysts named this unique finding the JOMANGY webshell. According to the official report, “JOMANGY is a PHP webshell family with no prior public documentation”.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-57819via security online infoExploited in the wildPre-authentication SQL Injection in FreePBX Endpoint ManagerForensics point to two high-confidence flaws tracked as CVE-2025-64328 and CVE-2025-57819. Many systems remain exposed because administrators fail to apply patches promptly. | Analysts named this unique finding the JOMANGY webshell. According to the official report, “JOMANGY is a PHP webshell family with no prior public documentation”.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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INJ3CTOR3

INJ3CTOR3 has upgraded its FreePBX toll-fraud campaign by adding credential theft to its existing JOMANGY webshell.

via gurucul threat researchcommunity.gurucul.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

Ultimately, the FreePBX exploitation campaign relies on known security loopholes for initial access. Forensics point to two high-confidence flaws tracked as CVE-2025-64328 and CVE-2025-57819.

Execution

4 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence4

Minute-level beacons, a restore line and a watchdog.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

CVE-2025-64328 is a post-authentication command injection flaw in the FreePBX filestore module

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence2

/x and k.php run as bash scripts fetched by cron.

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

The sixth is a PHP executor in the FreePBX high-availability module providing privileged command execution independently of all other channels.

Persistence

6 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

The second fires a re-infection payload on every root login and system reboot by injecting code into shell profile files.

T1037.004RC ScriptsEvidence1

Specifically, the threat actor establishes six independent survival channels on infected devices. These tracks include ... shell profile insertion ...

T1053.003CronEvidence4

Minute-level beacons, a restore line and a watchdog.

T1136Create AccountEvidence1

The infection also quietly drops 18 backdoor accounts across three tiers. Nine carry full root-equivalent privileges, eight operate at the service account level, and one is injected into the FreePBX web panel database via MySQL.

T1136.001Local AccountEvidence1

Backdoor Account newfpbx, newfpbxs, xhimax UID-0 OS backdoor accounts created via base64-obfuscated useradd commands

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence4

JOMANGY and ZenharR, 12 copies across the web root.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

The second fires a re-infection payload on every root login and system reboot by injecting code into shell profile files.

T1037.004RC ScriptsEvidence1

Specifically, the threat actor establishes six independent survival channels on infected devices. These tracks include ... shell profile insertion ...

T1053.003CronEvidence4

Minute-level beacons, a restore line and a watchdog.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence4

base64, base64 and ROT13 layers around the webshell; base64 cron payloads.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

When it executes, it aggressively cleanses the environment of other cybercriminals. For example, the payload scans for fifty distinct third-party webshell signatures. It deletes competing files... Concurrently, the code performs a self-eviction routine against its own older campaign files.

T1070.006TimestompEvidence2

touch -r copies footer.php’s timestamp onto the webshell.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

The third stores eight immutable crontab copies in hidden directories

Defense Impairment

3 techniques
T1222File and Directory Permissions ModificationEvidence1

The third stores eight immutable crontab copies in hidden directories, protected by a file attribute that silently blocks deletion even by root

T1222.002Linux and Mac PermissionsEvidence2

chattr +i and +a on webshells and crontab spares.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

It deletes competing files and blocks eleven adversary control servers bidirectionally.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The fourth is a process watchdog that immediately re-downloads the dropper if the beacon processes disappear.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

For example, the payload scans for fifty distinct third-party webshell signatures.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The first channel polls the attacker’s command-and-control server every one to three minutes via scheduled cron jobs

Impact

1 technique
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence2

Victim’s PBX and trunks used to place premium-rate calls.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

29 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
gurucul threat researchNews · Nov 2, 2026From Hijacked PBX to Stolen Trunk: INJ3CTOR3’s Campaign Evolves | Community Portal | GuruculWebshell used by INJ3CTOR3 in a FreePBX toll-fraud campaign, now enhanced to steal SIP trunk, AMI, database, and mail-relay credentials and exfiltrate them to attacker-controlled servers every minute. Stolen credentials enable continued unauthorized calling even after the infected PBX is cleaned or rebuilt. The campaign uses multiple C2 staging servers and rotated detection identifiers to hinder detection. Remediation requires removing the infection, investigating credential exposure, and rotating all affected secrets.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Oct 29, 2026Hackers Attack FreePBX Servers With Malware to Steal SIP Credentials for Phone FraudWebshell used in the INJ3CTOR3 operation against FreePBX phone servers to execute remote commands and access telephone-system functions. Researchers recovered two JOMANGY builds. The operation varies webshell watermarks and changed its authentication-gate hash to weaken older detection rules. Its broader malware installation repeatedly uploads sensitive configuration files and maintains multiple persistence mechanisms; live credential exfiltration was not captured.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Oct 29, 2026Hackers Attack FreePBX Servers With Malware to Steal SIP Credentials for Phone Fraud | Cryptika CybersecurityWebshell retained in the INJ3CTOR3 operation against FreePBX servers, providing remote command execution and access to phone-system functions. Researchers identified two JOMANGY builds. The operation's webshell watermarks and password-gate hash changed to weaken older detection rules, while multiple webshell copies and other persistence mechanisms can restore deleted components.Read more ↗malware newsNews · Oct 28, 2026From Hijacked PBX to Stolen Trunk: INJ3CTOR3’s Campaign Evolves - Malware News - Malware Analysis, News and IndicatorsWebshell deployed by INJ3CTOR3 against Asterisk-based PBX systems to support unauthorized access and toll fraud. Its panel can forge a FreePBX administrator session without the administrator password. The surrounding implant maintains redundant, self-repairing persistence through cron, login and boot triggers, backdoor accounts, and multiple webshell copies. September 2026 artifacts show that the accompanying k.php installer repeatedly uploads 17 configuration files containing SIP, AMI, database, and mail-relay credentials to two staging hosts. Stolen trunk credentials permit fraud after host remediation, making credential rotation after cleanup essential. Current builds rotate watermarks and share a changed gate hash with ZenharR.Read more ↗
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IOC matching29Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping21Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.