ZenharR
- Type
- Webshell
- Capabilities
- PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
- Platforms
- Linux
ZenharR is a webshell used by the INJ3CTOR3 operation on compromised FreePBX telephone servers. It provides remote command execution and access to phone-system functions, supporting continued attacker control of Asterisk-based VoIP infrastructure. It is deployed alongside the JOMANGY webshell in an operation associated with telephone toll fraud.
ZenharR and JOMANGY share a hardcoded, MD5-based authentication gate. The operation has rotated this shared gate between builds to weaken detection rules based on older identifiers. The gate is separate from legitimate FreePBX administrator authentication, so changing the administrator password does not disable it.
ZenharR forms part of a broader infection stack that maintains redundant webshell access and mutually repairing persistence through scheduled tasks, cached installers, login and boot triggers, and protected backups. The operation also deploys separate configuration-stealing components targeting telephony and infrastructure credentials; those collection functions are not established as native ZenharR capabilities.
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
“JOMANGY and ZenharR share a single hardcoded MD5 gate hash, rotated together from a2f6863413c4192a4abfa360577b9961 to 8b3a1d970fda0c17a0b785a990fb7b6a.”
Techniques & procedures
3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
1 technique
Execution
The first channel polls the attacker’s command-and-control server every one to three minutes via scheduled cron jobs, continuously re-downloading and re-executing the dropper.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
The first channel polls the attacker’s command-and-control server every one to three minutes via scheduled cron jobs, continuously re-downloading and re-executing the dropper.
JOMANGY and ZenharR, 12 copies across the web root.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
The first channel polls the attacker’s command-and-control server every one to three minutes via scheduled cron jobs, continuously re-downloading and re-executing the dropper.
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
The first channel polls the attacker’s command-and-control server every one to three minutes via scheduled cron jobs
Observables
11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.