Malware

Crystal PDF

For your environment

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique

T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

Mac users are encountering deceptive websites—often through Google Ads or malicious advertisements—that either prompt them to download fake applications or instruct them to copy and paste commands into their Terminal.

Execution

1 technique

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

In October 2025 and December 2025... established persistence via registry Run keys or scheduled tasks... CrystalPDF.exe establishes persistence via scheduled tasks.

Persistence

1 technique

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

In October 2025 and December 2025... established persistence via registry Run keys or scheduled tasks... CrystalPDF.exe establishes persistence via scheduled tasks.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

In October 2025 and December 2025... established persistence via registry Run keys or scheduled tasks... CrystalPDF.exe establishes persistence via scheduled tasks.

Credential Access

2 techniques

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

These campaigns leverage... to harvest credentials, session data, secrets from browsers, keychains, and developer environments.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

All three harvest the same types of data—browser credentials, saved passwords... CrystalPDF.exe... covertly hijacking Firefox and Chrome browsers to access sensitive files... including cookies, session data, and credential caches.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

3 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 months ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

microsoft security blogNews

Feb 2, 2026

Infostealers without borders: macOS, Python stealers, and platform abuse | Microsoft Security Blog

A malicious fake PDF editor used as an information stealer. Distributed via malvertising and SEO poisoning, it establishes persistence with scheduled tasks and hijacks Firefox and Chrome to steal cookies, session data, and credential caches from AppData\Roaming.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching3

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping4

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.