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Malware1 associated actor

Valkyrie Stealer

Tracked since May 24, 2026 · Updated 6 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK21Techniques
IOCs9Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lawxsz

The first part, published at dexpose.io, covered a deep technical reverse engineering of the Valkyrie Stealer, analyzing its capabilities, evasion techniques, and operator profile.

via malware newsmalware.news
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Earlier activity from January 2023 shows the same business model under different product names, with offers such as “Stealer/RAT 100% FUD undetect dm! with reverse shell”.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Then it parses the payload’s PE header, scans DLL exports for “ReflectiveLoader” and allocates memory inside the target browser’s process (e.g., chrome.exe) This injection is performed specifically to bypass App-Bound Encryption (ABE) by executing within the trusted application’s context.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Then it parses the payload’s PE header, scans DLL exports for “ReflectiveLoader” and allocates memory inside the target browser’s process (e.g., chrome.exe) This injection is performed specifically to bypass App-Bound Encryption (ABE) by executing within the trusted application’s context.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Before execution, Valkyrie performs numerous checks to detect virtualization, sandboxes, analysis tools, and low-resource systems. This includes process checks, registry inspection, hardware/resource validation, blacklist comparisons (MAC/IP/HWID), screen resolution checks, and a 3-minute watchdog timer.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

CPU core count & RAM check Next it checks the system hardware to detect low-resource sandbox environments. It first retrieves the CPU core count using GetSystemInfo; if the system reports fewer than two cores... If the total memory is below 2048 MB (2 GB), the malware logs “Low RAM”

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

Before the DLL can be reflectively loaded into memory, Valkyrie decrypts it using a ChaCha20 encryption routine... Then it parses the payload’s PE header, scans DLL exports for “ReflectiveLoader”

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

It fills the structure with strings and signatures matching popular virtualization platforms, sandbox environments, and debugging tools... ollydbg, idaq, ida64, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, ghidra, cheatengine, dnspy...

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

Valkyrie iterates over all extracted Discord tokens and validates each one through the official users/@me API endpoint. For every token that resolves to a real Discord profile, the stealer builds a structured object containing the victim’s username, discriminator, user ID, email, phone, and token.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

The most recent example is his Valkyrie Stealer, advertised on May 3, 2026 with the pitch “Valkyrie Stealer Services check my profile!! stealing passwords cookies wallets 200kb loader undetectable need affiliates”.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

The injected payload targets Chromium-based browsers (Chrome, Edge, Brave) by recovering the AES master key and parsing profile databases using internal SQLite engine.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

This file contains the encrypted_key field, which is a DPAPI-protected blob that contains the AES key used by the browser to encrypt passwords, cookies, and other records... These blobs are decrypted using the AES key previously extracted from the browser’s Local State file.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence2

the actor claimed to be developing a new sideloading-based crypter designed to leverage EV code-signing certificates to remain fully undetectable by SmartScreen, web browsers, and EDR/AV solutions.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

Next Valkyrie iterates over a hardcoded list of registry paths... It attempts to open every key in the list under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE using RegOpenKeyExA... compared to “vbox”, “virtual”, “vmware”, “qemu”, and “xen”.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

Valkyrie enumerates running processes using CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, Process32FirstW, and Process32NextW. For each process entry, it extracts the PID and executable name and stores both values into the output array.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

System Info Next the malware collect system information from the infected device: Host Name Username HWID MAC Address CPU brand GPU adapters RAM Free Disk Space Total Disk Space Windows version Windows build number

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Before execution, Valkyrie performs numerous checks to detect virtualization, sandboxes, analysis tools, and low-resource systems. This includes process checks, registry inspection, hardware/resource validation, blacklist comparisons (MAC/IP/HWID), screen resolution checks, and a 3-minute watchdog timer.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

CPU core count & RAM check Next it checks the system hardware to detect low-resource sandbox environments. It first retrieves the CPU core count using GetSystemInfo; if the system reports fewer than two cores... If the total memory is below 2048 MB (2 GB), the malware logs “Low RAM”

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

It fills the structure with strings and signatures matching popular virtualization platforms, sandbox environments, and debugging tools... ollydbg, idaq, ida64, windbg, x32dbg, x64dbg, ghidra, cheatengine, dnspy...

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Valkyrie Stealer is a multi-stage, modular data-theft framework designed to harvest a wide range of sensitive information from compromised Windows systems... browser data extraction, messaging-app session theft, game-account data collection, cryptocurrency-wallet theft

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Valkyrie captures a full-screen desktop image using standard GDI calls... The final file is saved as: %TEMP%\Valkyrie\screenshot.bmp

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Data Packaging, Encryption & Exfiltration All stolen data is compressed into a ZIP archive and encrypted using AES-GCM.

T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence1

If Minizip Compression fails and enough time remains, the malware tries PowerShell-based ZIP compressor by Building a PowerShell command: powershell.exe -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command ... [IO.Compression.ZipFile]::CreateFromDirectory

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Exfiltration occurs via an HTTP POST request to /api/log with encrypted payloads and system metadata.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

To obtain the primary C2 domain, Valkyrie sends an HTTP GET request to the following Steam profile... The extracted value is not an actual username, but an encrypted token. Valkyrie decrypts this token to obtain the real primary C2 domain: lylred[.]space | For C2 resolution, Valkyrie dynamically retrieves its primary server from a Steam profile and uses a fallback domain if needed.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The stealer sends the data to the C2 using an HTTP POST request to /api/log ... including ... encrypted blob and a data_json field containing host reconnaissance profile.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching9Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping21Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.