Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Conclusion : xxx is what we call Angler EK and Angler EK (indexm instance) is not that young! | This indexm.html variant of Angler EK is most probably still being used in RU/UA and was one of the early adopter of CVE-2015-0311 (a flash 0day from January) before many "standard" instances of Angler.
Conclusion : xxx is what we call Angler EK and Angler EK (indexm instance) is not that young! | 2015-01-27 - Angler EK "indexm" exploiting CVE-2015-2551 and firing Java exploits [Payload here is most probably Lurk]
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Conclusion : xxx is what we call Angler EK and Angler EK (indexm instance) is not that young!
9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
13 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.