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Mallory
Malware3 associated actors

Octo

Tracked since May 26, 2026 · Updated 21 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK28Techniques
IOCs121Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasion
Delivery
Landing pageLureFake update
Platforms
Android

Octo is an Android banking trojan with remote-access capabilities that enable on-device financial fraud. It is a rebranded evolution of ExobotCompact, with related variants also known as Coper, and belongs to the Exobot lineage first observed in 2016. Octo has been rented to multiple criminal operators through a malware-as-a-service operation associated with the aliases Architect and goodluck. Campaigns have targeted banking and financial-application users across Europe and other regions, including historical targeting of Colombian online banking users.

Octo abuses Android Accessibility Services for remote interaction and keylogging, and the MediaProjection API for live screen capture. Operators can read application interfaces, perform taps and gestures, enter text, manipulate the clipboard, and interact with financial applications directly on compromised devices. Its capabilities include credential-stealing overlays, capture of passwords and PINs, SMS interception, notification blocking, and collection and exfiltration of contacts, installed-application information, and device identifiers. Screen access can also expose authentication codes displayed by other applications. Octo conceals fraudulent activity with black overlays, reduced screen brightness, muted audio, and suppressed notifications. It includes mechanisms to resist removal, disable Google Play Protect, and hinder analysis through native-code payload protection and obfuscation.

Distribution has included malicious utility and security applications on Google Play, fraudulent landing pages, and fake browser or Play Store updates. Droppers including GymDrop and DawDropper have delivered Octo in multistage infections. Following a source-code leak in 2024, the original operator introduced Octo2, a variant with improved remote-session stability, reduced-bandwidth screen streaming, stronger native-library obfuscation, date-based command-and-control domain generation, and per-request encryption keys. Early Octo2 campaigns used applications impersonating legitimate software and employed Zombinder as an installation stage.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Architect

A new Android banking malware named Octo has appeared in the wild, featuring remote access capabilities that allow malicious operators to perform on-device fraud.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
goodluck

A new Android banking malware named Octo has appeared in the wild, featuring remote access capabilities that allow malicious operators to perform on-device fraud.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
sybra

The mobile threat landscape has been shaped over the years by well-established banking Trojan families such as Anatsa, Octo, Hook...

via threatfabricthreatfabric.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence3

These apps, which pose as Play Store app installer, screen recording, and financial apps, are "powered by inventive distribution schemes," distributing them through the Google Play store and via fraudulent landing pages that purportedly alert users to download a browser update.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Other Octo campaigns relied on sites using fake browser update notices or bogus Play Store app update warnings.

Execution

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Once the Octo malware is successfully launched in the victim’s device and gains primary permissions, it will keep the device awake and register a scheduled service to collect and upload sensitive data to its C&C server.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

the operator can further interact with the malware using a series of commands. All requests to/from the C2 infrastructure are AES encrypted and Base64 encoded.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Like other Android banking trojans, the rogue apps are nothing more than droppers, whose primary function is to deploy the malicious payload embedded within them.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Once the Octo malware is successfully launched in the victim’s device and gains primary permissions, it will keep the device awake and register a scheduled service to collect and upload sensitive data to its C&C server.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

The droppers, once installed, act as a conduit to launch the trojans, but not before requesting users to enable the Accessibility Services that allow it a wide breadth of capabilities to exfiltrate sensitive information from the compromised phones.

T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence3

The remote access is provided through a live screen streaming module (updated every second) through Android's MediaProjection and remote actions through the Accessibility Service.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Once the Octo malware is successfully launched in the victim’s device and gains primary permissions, it will keep the device awake and register a scheduled service to collect and upload sensitive data to its C&C server.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

The droppers, once installed, act as a conduit to launch the trojans, but not before requesting users to enable the Accessibility Services that allow it a wide breadth of capabilities to exfiltrate sensitive information from the compromised phones.

T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence3

The remote access is provided through a live screen streaming module (updated every second) through Android's MediaProjection and remote actions through the Accessibility Service.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

Accessibility Index: Displays instructions on how to enable Accessibility Services, which are required to be activated in order to facilitate remote interactions with the infected device. A degree of social engineering is employed to encourage the victim to take this action

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

Octo2 contains sophisticated obfuscation techniques to ensure the Trojan stays undetected... In Octo2, the developers implemented an even more sophisticated process of malicious code obfuscation... including decrypting and dynamically loading an additional native library, which is responsible for decrypting the malicious payload.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

To evade detection, all Dex classes associated with Coper/Octo are encrypted using a hardcoded RC4 key

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Another actor behind ExobotCompact.D seems to be highly focused on customers of several European banks and is using their icons and application names to lure victims into installing the application.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

Other notable features of Octo include... persistence measures to prevent uninstallation and evade antivirus engines.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

Once the contents of the keylogger data file have been fully read, the file is deleted.

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence3

Other notable features of Octo include... carrying out overlay attacks on banking apps to capture credentials...

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

Other notable features of Octo include logging keystrokes...

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

URL Inject: Displays an overlay web page, such as an authentication form, when the victim user accesses an app. The URL inject allows for the harvesting of credentials from any accounts or applications the operator wishes to target.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

The inputted data and cookie information are transferred back to the control server as with the other injects.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

The ultimate goal, ThreatFabric said, is to trigger the "automatic initiation of fraudulent transactions and its authorization without manual efforts from the operator..."

Discovery

4 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

When a victim device is initially registered with the bot C2 server, essential information such as the IMEI number, phone model, Android version, device uptime, etc., is collected and stored in an SQL database.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

Other notable features of Octo include... persistence measures to prevent uninstallation and evade antivirus engines.

T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence1

Like many malware families, Coper/Octo prohibits the infection of devices in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries and/or devices utilizing the official languages of these countries.

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1

Two values hold particular significance during the bot registration stage: $country and $lang

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.005VNCEvidence2

vnc_start / _stop: starts or stops VNC functionality - i.e., remote control of the device/screen

Collection

6 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The malware can also disable Google Play Protect ... and collects user data, including an infected mobile phone’s Android ID, contact list, installed apps, and even text messages.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence3

Other notable features of Octo include... carrying out overlay attacks on banking apps to capture credentials...

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

Other notable features of Octo include logging keystrokes...

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence1

URL Inject: Displays an overlay web page, such as an authentication form, when the victim user accesses an app. The URL inject allows for the harvesting of credentials from any accounts or applications the operator wishes to target.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence4

Octo, the revised version of ExobotCompact, is also equipped to perform on-device fraud by gaining remote control over the devices by taking advantage of the accessibility permissions as well as Android's MediaProjection API to capture screen contents in real-time.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

webinjects can alter what the user sees on his/her browser, as opposed to what's in fact being sent by the server... the webinject will interpret an identical design of legitimate pages from popular services.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

Update list of C2s

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

DawDropper uses Firebase Realtime Database, a third-party cloud service, to evade detection and dynamically obtain a payload download address. It also hosts malicious payloads on GitHub.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence4

Most of the changes are focused on increasing the stability of remote control sessions while performing Device Takeover attacks... The developers of Octo2 updated the RAT capabilities of the malware to increase the stability and decrease connection latency during remote sessions.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

121 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching121Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping28Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.