Malware

Tyupkin

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

First, they gain physical access to an ATM and insert a bootable CD to install the malware

T1200Hardware AdditionsEvidence2

Back then, we observed that the main infection vector was purely physical: The criminal had to physically open the casing of the ATM and access the machine’s internals to boot up from an external USB or CD.

Execution

2 techniques

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

The most interesting characteristic of Tyupkin is that it has the ability to limit its operation to specific hours and days of the week. It was reported that some Tyupkin instances can only be used on Sundays and Mondays at night.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

Some members of Tyupkin family are developed using C# and the .NET framework and some using Microsoft Visual C++.

Persistence

4 techniques

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The next step usually involves mounting the ATM’s internal operating system file structure, copying the malware into it, and modifying the OS so that it executes the malware on a regular boot.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The attackers copied the following files into the ATM: C:\Windows\system32\ulssm.exe %ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\AptraDebug.lnk ... the malware removes the .lnk file and create a key in the registry: [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] “AptraDebug” = “C:\Windows\system32\ulssm.exe”

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

they gain physical access to an ATM and insert a bootable CD to install the malware

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The next step usually involves mounting the ATM’s internal operating system file structure, copying the malware into it, and modifying the OS so that it executes the malware on a regular boot.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

they gain physical access to an ATM and insert a bootable CD to install the malware

Stealth

2 techniques

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

After some checks of the environment, the malware removes the .lnk file

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

After some checks of the environment, the malware removes the .lnk file ... In its last variant (version .d) the malware implements anti debug and anti emulation techniques

Discovery

1 technique

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

After some checks of the environment, the malware removes the .lnk file ... In its last variant (version .d) the malware implements anti debug and anti emulation techniques

Collection

1 technique

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

When the key is entered correctly, the ATM displays details of how much money is available in each cash cassette

Impact

1 technique

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

Once the ATM system has been rebooted, the infected ATM is under their control.

Other

1 technique

T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

In its last variant (version .d) the malware implements anti debug and anti emulation techniques, and also disables McAfee Solidcore from the infected system.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Hashes

8 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

4 SOURCESView more in app

securelistNews

Dec 4, 2021

ATM infector | Securelist

Referenced as another ATM malware used for comparison with Skimer's activation method.

talosintelligence otherNews

May 30, 2019

10 years of virtual dynamite: A high-level retrospective of ATM malware

ATM jackpotting malware that uses XFS APIs, can restrict operation to specific times, disables network connections before dispensing cash, and supports multiple currencies.

kasperskyNews

Sep 13, 2017

Tyupkin Virus (Malware) | ATM Machine Security | Virus Definition

ATM-targeting backdoor malware used to manipulate infected cash machines and dispense cash through direct operator commands after physical installation via a bootable CD.

securelistNews

Oct 7, 2014

Tyupkin: Manipulating ATM Machines with Malwar | Securelist

ATM-targeting backdoor malware that enables attackers with physical access to directly manipulate infected ATMs, view cash available in cassettes, and dispense 40 notes from a selected cassette. It uses time-based activation, session keys, anti-debug/anti-emulation techniques, and can disable the local network and McAfee Solidcore.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching8

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping12

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

Malware

Tyupkin

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

First, they gain physical access to an ATM and insert a bootable CD to install the malware

T1200Hardware AdditionsEvidence2

Execution

2 techniques

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

Some members of Tyupkin family are developed using C# and the .NET framework and some using Microsoft Visual C++.

Persistence

4 techniques

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The next step usually involves mounting the ATM’s internal operating system file structure, copying the malware into it, and modifying the OS so that it executes the malware on a regular boot.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

they gain physical access to an ATM and insert a bootable CD to install the malware

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The next step usually involves mounting the ATM’s internal operating system file structure, copying the malware into it, and modifying the OS so that it executes the malware on a regular boot.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

they gain physical access to an ATM and insert a bootable CD to install the malware

Stealth

2 techniques

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

After some checks of the environment, the malware removes the .lnk file

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

After some checks of the environment, the malware removes the .lnk file ... In its last variant (version .d) the malware implements anti debug and anti emulation techniques

Discovery

1 technique

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

After some checks of the environment, the malware removes the .lnk file ... In its last variant (version .d) the malware implements anti debug and anti emulation techniques

Collection

1 technique

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

When the key is entered correctly, the ATM displays details of how much money is available in each cash cassette

Impact

1 technique

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

Once the ATM system has been rebooted, the infected ATM is under their control.

Other

1 technique

T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

In its last variant (version .d) the malware implements anti debug and anti emulation techniques, and also disables McAfee Solidcore from the infected system.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Hashes

8 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

4 SOURCESView more in app

securelistNews

Dec 4, 2021

ATM infector | Securelist

Referenced as another ATM malware used for comparison with Skimer's activation method.

talosintelligence otherNews

May 30, 2019

10 years of virtual dynamite: A high-level retrospective of ATM malware

ATM jackpotting malware that uses XFS APIs, can restrict operation to specific times, disables network connections before dispensing cash, and supports multiple currencies.

kasperskyNews

Sep 13, 2017

Tyupkin Virus (Malware) | ATM Machine Security | Virus Definition

ATM-targeting backdoor malware used to manipulate infected cash machines and dispense cash through direct operator commands after physical installation via a bootable CD.

securelistNews

Oct 7, 2014

Tyupkin: Manipulating ATM Machines with Malwar | Securelist

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching8

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping12

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.