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Malware1 associated actor

SRBMiner-MULTI

Tracked since May 27, 2026 · Updated today
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days5 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs3Tracked
Type
Cryptominer
Capabilities
Crypto theft
Delivery
Seo poisoningLanding pageLure
Platforms
LinuxWindows

SRBMiner-MULTI is a publicly available cryptocurrency-mining application for CPUs and GPUs that is also deployed by threat actors for unauthorized mining on Windows and Linux systems. Its presence alone does not establish malicious activity; legitimate releases can be installed and operated without the system owner's authorization.

In the financially motivated Linux activity cluster REF3364, the Rust-based SANSAR orchestrator launches SRBMiner-MULTI version 3.6.9 for GPU mining and XMRig for CPU mining. Attackers accessed GPU infrastructure through an internet-exposed Ray job agent accepting unauthenticated submissions. SANSAR supplies mining configuration, including pool and wallet settings. Separate toolkit components conceal mining processes and falsify NVIDIA GPU monitoring results; these are not capabilities of SRBMiner-MULTI itself.

SRBMiner-MULTI has also been deployed in a Windows cryptojacking campaign targeting users likely to own high-performance GPUs, including gamers, hardware enthusiasts, and AI developers. That campaign uses poisoned search results and counterfeit utility-download sites, abuses ScreenConnect for persistent remote access, and dynamically delivers SRBMiner-MULTI alongside alternative miners such as gminer and lolMiner. Persistence, process hollowing, reconnaissance, and security-tool evasion in that operation are implemented by surrounding malware rather than established as native miner functionality.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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REF3364

tilki (SRBMiner-MULTI version 3.6.9), the miner selected by sansar's GPU branch

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence2

A sophisticated cryptojacking campaign is actively targeting users who search for popular PC utilities online... The attackers have built a network of more than 150 fake download sites that closely mimic trusted utility portals.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

In April 2026, researchers observed users receiving links to attacker-controlled domains directly from AI chatbot recommendations when asking for software download suggestions.

Execution

2 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

“Use its Logon, Scheduled Tasks, Services and WMI views to look for an entry whose target matches the recorded executable or a script that launches it.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

“Ending a process stops that instance. It does not remove a scheduled task, service, startup entry, or another program capable of starting it again.”

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

“Ending a process stops that instance. It does not remove a scheduled task, service, startup entry, or another program capable of starting it again.”

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The malware simplerunpe.exe invokes PowerShell to call the Add-MpPreference cmdlet, registering both path-based and process-based exclusions.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

“Use [Autoruns] Logon, Scheduled Tasks, Services and WMI views to look for an entry whose target matches the recorded executable or a script that launches it.”

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

“It does not remove a scheduled task, service, startup entry, or another program capable of starting it again.”

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

“Ending a process stops that instance. It does not remove a scheduled task, service, startup entry, or another program capable of starting it again.”

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence2

SimpleRunPE.exe does the heavy lifting from there... and uses process hollowing to inject mining code into a trusted Microsoft-signed binary.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

“Use [Autoruns] Logon, Scheduled Tasks, Services and WMI views to look for an entry whose target matches the recorded executable or a script that launches it.”

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

“It does not remove a scheduled task, service, startup entry, or another program capable of starting it again.”

Stealth

2 techniques
T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence2

SimpleRunPE.exe does the heavy lifting from there... and uses process hollowing to inject mining code into a trusted Microsoft-signed binary.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

The malware also watches for analysis tools like Windows Task Manager, Process Hacker, and Process Explorer. The moment it detects any of them running, it immediately pauses mining to avoid suspicion.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The malware simplerunpe.exe invokes PowerShell to call the Add-MpPreference cmdlet, registering both path-based and process-based exclusions.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Defender exclusions The malware simplerunpe.exe invokes PowerShell to call the Add-MpPreference cmdlet, registering both path-based and process-based exclusions.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

Закрепившись в системе, вредонос собирал подробную информацию о зараженной машине

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

The malware also watches for analysis tools like Windows Task Manager, Process Hacker, and Process Explorer. The moment it detects any of them running, it immediately pauses mining to avoid suspicion.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Rather than embedding the miners directly into the malware, the payload dynamically downloaded the most appropriate mining software after conducting extensive reconnaissance on the victim system, including GPU model, CPU specifications, installed antivirus software, memory configuration, and overall system activity.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

связывался с управляющим сервером и загружал один из майнеров — gminer, lolMiner или SRBMiner-MULTI

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Rather than embedding the miners directly into the malware, the payload dynamically downloaded the most appropriate mining software after conducting extensive reconnaissance on the victim system...

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

“Microsoft has documented a Windows campaign that delivered SRBMiner-MULTI alongside other miners after fake utility downloads and unauthorized ScreenConnect access.”

Impact

2 techniques
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence5

“SRBMiner-MULTI [is] a cryptocurrency miner for CPUs and GPUs” and “A genuine miner can be deployed without permission.”

T1496.001Compute HijackingEvidence1

kurt XMRig 6.25.0, mineur CPU ; tilki SRBMiner-MULTI 3.6.9, mineur GPU

Indicators of compromise

Observables

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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cysecurity newsNews · Nov 17, 2026New Linux Malware Uses Tor, Ethereum Blockchain, and Falsified GPU Data to Run Cryptomining Operations Undetected - CySecurity News - Latest Information Security and Hacking IncidentsGPU cryptocurrency miner deployed in version 3.6.9 and controlled by SANSAR. The toolkit conceals mining activity through falsified GPU telemetry and process filtering.Read more ↗the hacker newsNews · Nov 16, 2026SANSAR Linux Cryptomining Malware Uses Modified NVIDIA Library to Hide GPU ActivitySRBMiner-MULTI version 3.6.9 is deployed as tilki and selected by SANSAR for GPU cryptocurrency mining. The operation uses a modified NVML wrapper to conceal GPU utilization and falsify temperature and power readings.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Nov 13, 2026Hackers Use SANSAR Linux Malware to Hide Crypto Mining by Faking 0% GPU UsagePublicly available mining software deployed under the filename tilki for unauthorized GPU mining. SANSAR configures and launches it, while the toolkit's modified monitoring library conceals GPU workload measurements.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Nov 13, 2026Hackers Use SANSAR Linux Malware to Hide Crypto Mining by Faking 0% GPU Usage | Cryptika CybersecurityPublicly available mining software abused for GPU mining under SANSAR's supervision. SANSAR supplies mining configuration, while the toolkit's modified monitoring library conceals GPU activity by falsifying telemetry. The observed executable was named tilki; researchers found no hardcoded fallback pool or wallet in the controller's launch paths.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching3Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.