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Malware

SRBMiner-MULTI

SRBMiner-MULTI is a GPU-focused cryptocurrency mining program observed as a final payload in an active cryptojacking campaign reported by Microsoft in 2026. In the documented activity, attackers used more than 150 fake software download sites impersonating popular utilities such as CrystalDiskInfo, HWMonitor, Display Driver Uninstaller, FurMark, K-Lite Codec Pack, and PDFgear to target users likely to own high-performance discrete GPUs, including gamers, hardware enthusiasts, and AI developers/users. Infection commonly began with malicious ZIP archives containing a legitimate executable and a malicious autorun.dll used for DLL sideloading. The sideloaded DLL installed a second-stage component, including a packaged ScreenConnect installer disguised as vcredist_x64.dll, giving the attackers persistent remote access. Attackers then delivered SimpleRunPE.exe, which established persistence via Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and Startup artifacts, added Microsoft Defender exclusions, performed anti-analysis checks, and used process hollowing into trusted Microsoft-signed .NET binaries such as MSBuild.exe, InstallUtil.exe, RegAsm.exe, RegSvcs.exe, AppLaunch.exe, AddInProcess.exe, and aspnet_compiler.exe. After host reconnaissance, the malware dynamically selected and downloaded one of several miners, including SRBMiner-MULTI, gminer, or lolMiner, based on system characteristics such as GPU capability. The broader malware monitored for analysis and system-monitoring tools including Task Manager, Process Explorer, Process Hacker, System Informer, dnSpy, x64dbg, IDA, Ghidra, ProcMon, Wireshark, and Fiddler, and paused or terminated mining when such tools were detected. Microsoft also reported campaign infrastructure including gleeze[.]com subdomains, WebSocket C2 at wss://minemine.gleeze[.]com:8443/ws, attacker-controlled ScreenConnect infrastructure at 193.42.11[.]108, and related domains such as directdownload[.]icu. Within this campaign, SRBMiner-MULTI was one of the GPU mining payloads used to monetize compromised hosts.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence2

A sophisticated cryptojacking campaign is actively targeting users who search for popular PC utilities online... The attackers have built a network of more than 150 fake download sites that closely mimic trusted utility portals.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence2

In April 2026, researchers observed users receiving links to attacker-controlled domains directly from AI chatbot recommendations when asking for software download suggestions.

Persistence

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The malware simplerunpe.exe invokes PowerShell to call the Add-MpPreference cmdlet, registering both path-based and process-based exclusions.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence2

SimpleRunPE.exe does the heavy lifting from there... and uses process hollowing to inject mining code into a trusted Microsoft-signed binary.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence2

SimpleRunPE.exe does the heavy lifting from there... and uses process hollowing to inject mining code into a trusted Microsoft-signed binary.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

The malware also watches for analysis tools like Windows Task Manager, Process Hacker, and Process Explorer. The moment it detects any of them running, it immediately pauses mining to avoid suspicion.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The malware simplerunpe.exe invokes PowerShell to call the Add-MpPreference cmdlet, registering both path-based and process-based exclusions.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

Закрепившись в системе, вредонос собирал подробную информацию о зараженной машине

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

The malware also watches for analysis tools like Windows Task Manager, Process Hacker, and Process Explorer. The moment it detects any of them running, it immediately pauses mining to avoid suspicion.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Rather than embedding the miners directly into the malware, the payload dynamically downloaded the most appropriate mining software after conducting extensive reconnaissance on the victim system, including GPU model, CPU specifications, installed antivirus software, memory configuration, and overall system activity.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

связывался с управляющим сервером и загружал один из майнеров — gminer, lolMiner или SRBMiner-MULTI

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Rather than embedding the miners directly into the malware, the payload dynamically downloaded the most appropriate mining software after conducting extensive reconnaissance on the victim system...

Impact

1 technique
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence4

Anyone visiting one of these sites and clicking the download button ends up with a ZIP archive containing both the real software and a hidden malicious file... secretly mine cryptocurrency using their own GPU.

Other

1 technique
T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Defender exclusions The malware simplerunpe.exe invokes PowerShell to call the Add-MpPreference cmdlet, registering both path-based and process-based exclusions.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
2 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday
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IOC matching2

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Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping11

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.