MalwareExploits 1 CVE

FortiEndpoint_Patch.exe

For your environment

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES

CVE-2026-35616Authentication Bypass in Fortinet FortiClient EMS

The executable, named "FortiEndpoint_Patch.exe," masquerades as an update, but, in reality, is a previously unreported Windows information stealer capable of harvesting sensitive data, such as passwords, cookies, and autofill details such as credit card information, addresses, and phone numbers, from Chromium- and Gecko-based browsers.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

3 techniques

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

Threat actors disguised the credential stealer payload as a Fortinet endpoint update, silently executing the malicious executable through PowerShell.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

the attack has been found to leverage "fortitray.exe," a legitimate executable associated with FortiClient to launch a .cmd script file using "cmd.exe."

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Once the threat actors had a route to modify EMS-managed configuration, every managed endpoint became a potential execution target without requiring a separate intrusion path to each device.

Stealth

1 technique

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The executable, named "FortiEndpoint_Patch.exe," masquerades as an update, but, in reality, is a previously unreported Windows information stealer

Credential Access

2 techniques

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Collection

1 technique

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The data is written to a log file and saved to the ProgramData directory.

Command and Control

1 technique

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The .cmd script is designed to invoke a Base64-encoded PowerShell script that, in turn, is responsible for downloading a malicious payload, running it

Exfiltration

1 technique

T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

The .cmd script is designed to invoke a Base64-encoded PowerShell script that, in turn, is responsible for downloading a malicious payload, running it, and exfiltrating the results to "83.138.53[.]110" via an HTTP POST request.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting

ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app26 days ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

the hacker newsNews

May 28, 2026

Threat Actors Exploit Critical FortiClient EMS Flaw to Deploy Credential Stealer

A previously unreported Windows information stealer delivered via compromised FortiClient EMS infrastructure. It masquerades as a Fortinet endpoint update, harvests browser-stored passwords, cookies, and autofill data from Chromium- and Gecko-based browsers, writes the stolen data to a log file in ProgramData, and relies on a PowerShell script to exfiltrate the collected data to attacker-controlled infrastructure.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping9

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

MalwareExploits 1 CVE

FortiEndpoint_Patch.exe

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES

CVE-2026-35616Authentication Bypass in Fortinet FortiClient EMS

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

3 techniques

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

Threat actors disguised the credential stealer payload as a Fortinet endpoint update, silently executing the malicious executable through PowerShell.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

the attack has been found to leverage "fortitray.exe," a legitimate executable associated with FortiClient to launch a .cmd script file using "cmd.exe."

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Once the threat actors had a route to modify EMS-managed configuration, every managed endpoint became a potential execution target without requiring a separate intrusion path to each device.

Stealth

1 technique

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The executable, named "FortiEndpoint_Patch.exe," masquerades as an update, but, in reality, is a previously unreported Windows information stealer

Credential Access

2 techniques

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Collection

1 technique

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The data is written to a log file and saved to the ProgramData directory.

Command and Control

1 technique

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The .cmd script is designed to invoke a Base64-encoded PowerShell script that, in turn, is responsible for downloading a malicious payload, running it

Exfiltration

1 technique

T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting

ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app26 days ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

the hacker newsNews

May 28, 2026

Threat Actors Exploit Critical FortiClient EMS Flaw to Deploy Credential Stealer

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping9

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.