Loading malware…
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Another site, pdf-reader[.]help, registered two days later, claimed to provide secure PDF viewing and editing capabilities... A third domain, live-war-map[.]com, registered in January 2025, advertised itself as a source of information about military incidents and conflict activity.
7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Android spyware distributed via fraudulent websites impersonating utilities, war-related update services, and a government news source. The malicious apps combine legitimate-looking functionality with stealthy spyware capabilities and require users to manually install the app and grant permissions.
Previously undocumented Android spyware distributed via fraudulent websites masquerading as legitimate services. The malicious apps combine advertised functionality with hidden background surveillance capabilities and rely on users manually installing the apps and granting permissions to access sensitive device information.
Android spyware targeting Arabic-speaking users through apps masquerading as conflict-tracking tools.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.