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Mallory
Malware

RUSTCLOAK

Tracked since May 29, 2026 · Updated 6 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs10Tracked

RUSTCLOAK is a Rust-based intermediate loader used in the Operation Dragon Weave cyber-espionage campaign identified by Seqrite. It is delivered after a spear-phishing infection chain that uses ZIP archives with government-themed lures and two execution paths: a malicious LNK that launches VBScript and PowerShell, or a Rust-based dropper executable. Both paths converge on RuntimeBroker_update.exe, which uses DLL sideloading to load a malicious UnityPlayer.dll and execute RUSTCLOAK.

RUSTCLOAK performs anti-analysis checks before payload execution, including retrieving the local computer name and comparing it against a hardcoded list of more than 100 known sandbox and analyst machine names; it terminates if a match is found. It decrypts the next-stage payload through a triple-layer routine described in the reporting as modified/custom RC4, Base64 decoding, and either SM4-CBC or AES-CBC, depending on the source summary. One detailed extraction reports decryption of Com.dat using RC4 with key F8 83 40 17 1D 66 AA C2 B0 25 A8 6C A0 DD C4 5A, followed by SM4-CBC with key CD CE 4F DB 3E 6A F2 44 AC 62 8C F4 96 1F 6B FB and IV FA 70 B1 81 A0 BA 5D 46 7A 5D 40 DD 99 B6 9B 42. After decryption, RUSTCLOAK allocates memory and transfers execution to shellcode in memory using Windows APIs including VirtualAlloc, VirtualProtect, CreateFiberEx, and SwitchToFiber, notably using Windows fibers instead of creating a new thread.

The loader’s final payload is AZUREVEIL, a 64-bit Adaptix C2 agent compiled as a DLL. AZUREVEIL uses Microsoft Azure Blob Storage as a dead-drop command-and-control channel, allowing encrypted beacons, commands, and exfiltrated results to blend with normal enterprise cloud traffic. Reported post-exploitation capabilities of the downstream payload include file operations, shell execution, process manipulation, port forwarding, SOCKS/proxy functions, downloading secondary files, exfiltration, and in-memory execution of Beacon Object Files. Reported associated filenames in the infection chain include RuntimeBroker_update.exe, UnityPlayer.dll, Profile.ps1, empty.vbs, 1.dat, and Com.dat. A reported network indicator associated with the campaign is note1ggbbhggdwa1[.]blob[.]core[.]windows[.]net. Seqrite assessed the broader campaign with moderate confidence as China-linked, targeting organizations and officials in the Czech Republic and Taiwan, particularly in government/public sector, research/academia, technology/software, and financial services.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

"Operation Dragon Weave," a spear-phishing campaign that starts with sending email to a target with an attached zip file and instructions to open it, under the guise of something like an upcoming business meeting or ... an appointment with the Czech Social Security Administration (ČSSZ).

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence4

...clicking on an enclosed LNK shortcut file, which runs a PowerShell script to decrypt all necessary components; it then executes them through a file named RuntimeBroker_update.exe.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

Stage two involves a VBScript and PowerShell chain... File Name empty.vbs VBScript launcher triggering PowerShell execution chain.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence5

the campaign initiates when a user downloads a malicious compressed archive... In Path A, the victim double-clicks a deceptive shortcut file masquerading as a standard PDF document.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The primary way the infection starts is through clicking on an enclosed LNK shortcut file, which runs a PowerShell script to decrypt all necessary components...

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

the loader deploys unique Windows fibers to transfer execution over to the decrypted shellcode. This method injects a fully functional remote control agent directly into system RAM.

T1055.011Extra Window Memory InjectionEvidence1

Instead, the loader deploys unique Windows fibers to transfer execution over to the decrypted shellcode.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The primary way the infection starts is through clicking on an enclosed LNK shortcut file, which runs a PowerShell script to decrypt all necessary components...

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The blog also examines how trusted services such as Microsoft Azure Blob Storage are abused for command-and-control communication, and how the Adaptix agent is used for data exfiltration and remote control. In addition, we analyze the multi-layer encryption used to protect the payload and how it helps the attacker evade detection.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

the loader deploys unique Windows fibers to transfer execution over to the decrypted shellcode. This method injects a fully functional remote control agent directly into system RAM.

T1055.011Extra Window Memory InjectionEvidence1

Instead, the loader deploys unique Windows fibers to transfer execution over to the decrypted shellcode.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

the loader implements a complex triple-layer decryption routine to extract the final payload. The setup combines custom RC4 operations, Base64 decoding, and advanced SM4-CBC algorithms.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence3

the malware terminates immediately if it detects an automated sandbox network. This clever validation routine keeps the infection hidden from automated endpoint scanners.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

Before executing any malicious functions, the software performs exhaustive environment verification checks... It cross-references these findings against an embedded database containing over 100 sandbox indicators. Consequently, the malware terminates immediately if it detects an automated sandbox network.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

This shows that RUSTCLOAK is not just executing raw shellcode directly, instead it decrypts and loads a full executable in memory and then transfers execution to it.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence3

the malware terminates immediately if it detects an automated sandbox network. This clever validation routine keeps the infection hidden from automated endpoint scanners.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

Before executing any malicious functions, the software performs exhaustive environment verification checks... It cross-references these findings against an embedded database containing over 100 sandbox indicators. Consequently, the malware terminates immediately if it detects an automated sandbox network.

Collection

2 techniques
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

The zip file attached to the spear-phishing email contains multiple files, including an executable that opens a decoy PDF...

T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence1

The attack begins with a ZIP archive delivered via email... Analysts at Seqrite... noted the use of two separate delivery paths contained within a single archive.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The loader decrypts and runs the ultimate payload, tracked as "Azureveil," which is an Adaptix command-and-control (C2) agent.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

10 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching10Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.