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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 1 actor

Nimbus RAT

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Storm-1811

Threat actors used Microsoft Teams voice phishing (vishing) to deceive the victim into granting remote access via Quick Assist, then deployed a Java-based remote access trojan (RAT). TRU tracks this malware as Nimbus RAT.

via esentire blogesentire.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1598.004Spearphishing VoiceEvidence2

The malicious operators combine email harassment with voice phishing tactics to breach network perimeters.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence3

Posing as internal support staff, the attacker convinced the user to launch Quick Assist | Microsoft Teams is used for initial access

T1566.004Spearphishing VoiceEvidence1

attackers used Microsoft Teams voice phishing to trick a user into granting remote access via Windows Quick Assist

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2
TacticExecution

Quick Assist Launch and Initial Recon using cmd

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1
TacticExecution

...this multi-layered assault tricks corporate employees into downloading an advanced Java-based backdoor threat.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2
TacticExecution

The downloaded archive contained a malicious Java archive, bundled with an OpenJDK runtime, allowing execution on any Windows system

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

It supports arbitrary command execution, file system manipulation, registry access

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The user followed the Pastebin instructions: extracted the archive to C:\ProgramData\InboxCorePro\, imported InboxCorePro.reg via regedit.exe, and placed a launcher in the Startup folder.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The user followed the Pastebin instructions: extracted the archive to C:\ProgramData\InboxCorePro\, imported InboxCorePro.reg via regedit.exe, and placed a launcher in the Startup folder.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2
TacticStealth

Posing as internal support staff

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2
TacticStealth

It supports ... in-memory execution of second-stage payloads

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

It supports arbitrary command execution, file system manipulation, registry access

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Nimbus RAT can display either a Java Swing imitation of the Windows Security credential prompt or invoke the real Windows CredUIPromptForCredentialsW API directly via JNA ... Both approaches are designed to capture two password entries

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

it includes dual credential-harvesting mechanisms: a fake Windows Security prompt and direct API invocation via CredUIPromptForCredentialsW

Discovery

3 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Reconnaissance ipconfig equiv. Full network adapter info via GetNetworkParams + GetAdaptersInfo (JNA)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

Quick Assist Launch and Initial Recon using cmd

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

It supports arbitrary command execution, file system manipulation

Collection

3 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

Nimbus RAT can display either a Java Swing imitation of the Windows Security credential prompt or invoke the real Windows CredUIPromptForCredentialsW API directly via JNA ... Both approaches are designed to capture two password entries

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

It supports arbitrary command execution, file system manipulation, registry access, screenshot capture

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

File system za / tz / z ZIP directory, ZIP single file inline, extract ZIP (with optional password)

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

the malware communicates with legitimate Google APIs, making network-level detection extremely difficult | Nimbus RAT is a modular and highly capable implant... A defining feature of Nimbus RAT is its use of Google Drive and Google Sheets as C2 channels.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

All command delivery and data exfiltration travels over legitimate Google API endpoints.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

Commands are fetched from attacker-controlled Google Drive files, and exfiltrated data is uploaded in the same way.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The final payload was retrieved from a compromised Microsoft 365 tenant hosted on SharePoint

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

the attacker convinced the user to launch Quick Assist and follow step-by-step instructions

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

All C2 traffic is RSA-encrypted using a hardcoded 4096-bit public key embedded in the JAR.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

exfiltrated data is uploaded in the same way

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

The tool, which TRU identifies as InboxSetupPro ... uses OneDrive rather than Google Drive for exfiltration.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
7 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

cyber security newsNews
Jun 4, 2026
Hackers Abusing Microsoft Teams and Google Drive to Deploy Remote Access Malware

A Java-based modular remote access trojan delivered via Quick Assist and a SharePoint-hosted archive. It establishes persistence, uses encrypted communications, abuses Google Drive and Google Sheets as command-and-control channels, supports arbitrary command execution, file system and registry access, screenshot capture, in-memory second-stage payload execution, and credential harvesting via fake Windows Security prompts and CredUIPromptForCredentialsW.

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security online infoNews
Jun 4, 2026
Microsoft Teams Vishing Attack Drops Nimbus RAT

A Java-based remote access backdoor used after Microsoft Teams vishing attacks. It establishes persistence on endpoints and uses Google Drive and Google Sheets for command-and-control to blend malicious traffic with benign cloud activity.

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esentire blogNews
May 28, 2026
Nimbus RAT: How Threat Actors Are Abusing Microsoft Teams and Google Drive to Deploy a Java RAT | eSentire

Java-based remote access trojan used after Teams vishing and Quick Assist access. It bundles its own OpenJDK runtime, uses Google Drive and Google Sheets/Google APIs for command-and-control, supports shell execution, file operations, registry access, screenshots, credential theft via fake or native Windows prompts, and in-memory second-stage Java code execution. It does not autonomously install persistence; operators stage persistence separately.

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What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching9

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping25

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.