AnimateClipper is a cryptocurrency clipper malware family that monitors the Windows clipboard and replaces copied wallet addresses with attacker-controlled alternatives, enabling silent redirection of cryptocurrency transfers. It is designed to hijack transactions across more than 20 blockchain ecosystems.
AnimateClipper has been observed in large-scale malware distribution operations that impersonate legitimate open-source, freeware, and Windows application download sites. In these campaigns, victims are funneled through traffic distribution infrastructure that filters users by factors such as geography, browser characteristics, VPN usage, and likely researcher activity before serving payloads. Delivery has also been associated with ClickFix-style lures, including fake verification prompts that trick users into launching remote script execution through native Windows utilities.
Observed infection chains use multiple staged components and obfuscation, including script-based loaders, PowerShell, a bundled Python environment, and in-memory shellcode execution before the final payload is loaded. The malware’s core function is clipboard surveillance and substitution of cryptocurrency wallet addresses, allowing theft of funds without obvious signs to the victim at the time of transfer. AnimateClipper has been linked to campaigns that also distributed Remus Stealer and the SessionGate framework, indicating use within broader malware delivery ecosystems rather than as a standalone operation.
The malware targets Windows systems and is primarily relevant to users who download software from spoofed project sites, especially security tools, developer tools, and popular freeware applications. Its operational objective is crypto theft rather than credential collection or ransomware-style disruption.
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23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
регистрация доменов - на T1583.001 (Domains). Атакующие инвестируют в подготовку инфраструктуры задолго до раздачи пейлоадов
This kicks off a complex chain involving PowerShell, RC4 decryption, a Python environment, and a hidden loader inside a deceptive file (node_modules.asar).
Its beginning contains an HTA page with obfuscated VBScript, which mshta.exe executes.
This kicks off a complex chain involving PowerShell, RC4 decryption, a Python environment, and a hidden loader inside a deceptive file (node_modules.asar).
These pages load a CloudFront-hosted JavaScript staging layer that converts a click on a “download” button/link into a handoff to a Traffic Distribution System (TDS). The TDS enforces strict gating: first-visit state, mandatory click confirmation, anti-bot/anti-analysis logic, VPN/datacenter filtering, and frequency capping.
SessionGate — A previously unknown multi-stage loader with heavy obfuscation and extensive anti-analysis mechanisms... Because of the obfuscation techniques in use, including injected junk code, opaque predicates, and string encryption, the resulting functions become extremely bloated.
This unknown multi-stage loader disguises itself as a 7-Zip SFX installer... AnimateClipper: Using the ClickFix technique, a fake Cloudflare verification screen tricks users into running a remote script via mshta.exe.
The obfuscated script embeds a large shellcode blob directly in its body and launches it from memory. It copies the shellcode into a buffer, changes the memory protection to executable, and transfers execution to it via ntdll!LdrCallEnclave.
This kicks off a complex chain involving PowerShell, RC4 decryption... requiring a one-time key from yourfastcrc.com to decrypt subsequent payloads.
These pages load a CloudFront-hosted JavaScript staging layer that converts a click on a “download” button/link into a handoff to a Traffic Distribution System (TDS). The TDS enforces strict gating: first-visit state, mandatory click confirmation, anti-bot/anti-analysis logic, VPN/datacenter filtering, and frequency capping.
Using the ClickFix technique, a fake Cloudflare verification screen tricks users into running a remote script via mshta.exe.
The stealer polls the C2 using HTTP POST requests ... The malware uses HTTPS to communicate with the resolved C2 server. In the analyzed build, the observed logic includes periodic refresh check-ins
Маршрутизация Multi-hop Proxy (T1090.003, C2) TDS-цепочка из 4+ промежуточных нод для обфускации
These pages load a CloudFront-hosted JavaScript staging layer that converts a click on a 'download' button/link into a handoff to a Traffic Distribution System (TDS). The TDS enforces strict gating: first-visit state, mandatory click confirmation, anti-bot/anti-analysis logic, VPN/datacenter filtering, and frequency capping.
These pages load a CloudFront-hosted JavaScript staging layer that converts a click on a “download” button/link into a handoff to a Traffic Distribution System (TDS). The TDS enforces strict gating: first-visit state, mandatory click confirmation, anti-bot/anti-analysis logic, VPN/datacenter filtering, and frequency capping.
31 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned only as another malware family used in a separate SEO poisoning operation.
Mentioned only as part of a separate malware delivery operation cited for comparison.
A cryptocurrency clipper used via fake software download sites that replaces copied wallet addresses with attacker-controlled addresses.
Криптоклиппер, который подменяет адреса криптокошельков в буфере обмена; поддерживает более 20 блокчейн-экосистем.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.