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Malware1 associated actor

Arid Gopher

Tracked since Jun 5, 2026 · Updated 10 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days5 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs13Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Delivery
Lure
Platforms
Windows

Arid Gopher is a Go-based Windows backdoor used by the cyber-espionage group Arid Viper, also known as Mantis, APT-C-23, and Desert Falcon. Identified publicly in 2022, it is a variant of the Micropsia malware family that shares functional and code similarities with earlier Arid Viper tooling. It has been deployed against Palestinian organizations, including the Palestinian Authority’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Arid Gopher has been distributed in compressed archives and displays decoy documents when executed. It establishes command-and-control communications and executes additional components on compromised systems. Observed deployments use HTTP-based communications and embedded helper components, including utilities that establish persistence through Windows registry startup entries. In intrusions observed during late 2022 and early 2023, Micropsia deployed Arid Gopher onto already-compromised computers.

The malware has undergone substantial rewriting between variants to evade detection. Its operators have deployed distinct variants across separate groups of computers within the same victim organization, compartmentalizing access to help preserve their foothold if one deployment is discovered.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Arid Viper

We assess with high confidence that the sample is Arid Gopher, and therefore Arid Viper activity. The two campaigns share the victimology and naming habits.

via blueteamsecinfosec.pub
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1585.001Social Media AccountsEvidence1

The group is known for employing spear-phishing emails and fake social media profiles to lure targets into installing malware on their devices.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

The group is known for employing spear-phishing emails and fake social media profiles to lure targets into installing malware on their devices.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The variants are emailed to targets in .xz RAR archives, and unpack with a long filename to hopefully push their .exe extension out of sight.

Execution

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The last malicious activity occurred from January 12 onwards when Arid Gopher was used to execute the unknown file named localsecuritypolicy.exe every ten hours.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The last malicious activity occurred from January 12 onwards when Arid Gopher was used to execute the unknown file named localsecuritypolicy.exe every ten hours.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Arid Gopher was in turn used to run a tool called SetRegRunKey.exe that provided persistence by adding Arid Gopher to the registry so that it executed on reboot.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The last malicious activity occurred from January 12 onwards when Arid Gopher was used to execute the unknown file named localsecuritypolicy.exe every ten hours.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Arid Gopher was in turn used to run a tool called SetRegRunKey.exe that provided persistence by adding Arid Gopher to the registry so that it executed on reboot.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Three distinct sets of obfuscated PowerShell commands were executed to load a Base64-encoded string, which started embedded shellcode.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The variants are emailed to targets in .xz RAR archives, and unpack with a long filename to hopefully push their .exe extension out of sight.

T1036.006Space after FilenameEvidence1

and drop a decoy document on the desktop and display it so that the victim thinks they've simply saved and opened an attached Word file and not malware.

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

On December 21, RAR was executed to archive files on another infected computer.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

When uploading each file, the tools sends an HTTP POST request to a C&C server...

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

our investigation revealed a 'helper' malware, also written in Go, and a second-stage malware which was downloaded from the C2 [command-and-control] server.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

This was immediately followed by the exfiltration of a RAR file...

Indicators of compromise

Observables

13 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching13Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.