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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

Glasswire

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Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Arid Viper

We have also identified a variant we call Glasswire that appears to be written and compiled in Embarcadero Delphi... This variant is very similar to Pierogi...

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Allow an attacker to run arbitrary commands

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

some of the samples had the capability to also establish persistence via the Windows registry (Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run).

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

They often do this by creating a shortcut to the malware in the AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup directory.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

some of the samples had the capability to also establish persistence via the Windows registry (Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run).

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

They often do this by creating a shortcut to the malware in the AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup directory.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Most samples are found to have a combination of the following features: ... Install a keylogger

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Most samples are found to have a combination of the following features: ... Extract and upload stored credentials

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Most samples are found to have a combination of the following features: ... Install a keylogger

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Search for files of specific types and add them to RAR archives for exfiltration

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Use Base64 to obfuscate command and control communications

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Some Primewire samples utilize “multipart/form-data” for command and control check-ins... other samples combine the C2 parameters into a single “application/x-www-form-urlencoded” POST body.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Allow an attacker to download and run arbitrary files

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app—
ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

2 SOURCESView more in app
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
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IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping9

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.