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Mallory
Malware

js-digest

Tracked since Jun 12, 2026 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence6

The Arch User Repository (AUR) suspended new registrations Monday due to an ongoing supply chain attack flooding the repository with more than 1,500 malicious packages.

T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence4

The attackers injected commands into build scripts that pulled malicious dependencies, including rogue npm packages such as atomic-lockfile and js-digest, which executed automatically during the package build process.

T1199Trusted RelationshipEvidence1

This attack goes after the trust model, not a software flaw. The compromised packages kept their names, their histories, and the trust that came with them. Only the build instructions changed.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence8

In an initial wave affecting about 400 packages, this script executed an npm install command for a package called atomic-lockfile. Shortly afterward, the attackers switched tactics, instead using the Bun runtime to install packages called js-digest and lockfile-js

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

atomic-lockfile ‘s package.json contains a preinstall lifecycle hook: "preinstall": "./src/hooks/deps"

T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

A user runs their AUR helper ( yay , paru , or raw makepkg ) to install or update a package.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

the attack began Thursday when attackers abused AUR’s stewardship process for adopting orphaned packages to claim ownership of abandoned, legitimate packages and modify them with malicious PKGBUILD post-install scripts.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

После получения контроля над такими проектами они изменяли файлы PKGBUILD и .install, добавляя команду npm install atomic-lockfile. Под видом обычной npm-зависимости загружался вредоносный пакет atomic-lockfile версии 1.4.2.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055.013Process DoppelgängingEvidence1

Beyond data theft, the malware employed rootkit-style persistence techniques, disguising its active processes as legitimate kernel threads to evade detection by standard process monitors like ps and htop.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1

Beyond data theft, the malware employed rootkit-style persistence techniques, disguising its active processes as legitimate kernel threads to evade detection by standard process monitors like ps and htop.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The outer package is a largely functional TypeScript npm package (legitimate atomic-lockfile project) with the ELF binary inserted into its source tree.

T1055.013Process DoppelgängingEvidence1

Beyond data theft, the malware employed rootkit-style persistence techniques, disguising its active processes as legitimate kernel threads to evade detection by standard process monitors like ps and htop.

T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

A user runs their AUR helper ( yay , paru , or raw makepkg ) to install or update a package.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

This means a developer workstation, maintainer machine, or CI/build host could execute the malware as a side effect of building or installing the compromised AUR package.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

the attack began Thursday when attackers abused AUR’s stewardship process for adopting orphaned packages to claim ownership of abandoned, legitimate packages and modify them with malicious PKGBUILD post-install scripts.

T1574.006Dynamic Linker HijackingEvidence1

После получения контроля над такими проектами они изменяли файлы PKGBUILD и .install, добавляя команду npm install atomic-lockfile. Под видом обычной npm-зависимости загружался вредоносный пакет atomic-lockfile версии 1.4.2.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Once installed, the malicious npm packages deployed a multi-stage infostealer payload engineered to exfiltrate a broad range of sensitive data, including: Browser credentials — saved passwords, session cookies, and autofill data from Chromium and Firefox-based browsers.

T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

SSH private keys — enabling attackers to pivot to remote servers and infrastructure System environment variables — potentially exposing API tokens, cloud credentials, and application secrets Cryptocurrency wallet data — targeting local wallet files and seed phrases.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Once installed, the malicious npm packages deployed a multi-stage infostealer payload engineered to exfiltrate a broad range of sensitive data, including: Browser credentials — saved passwords, session cookies, and autofill data from Chromium and Firefox-based browsers.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

SSH private keys — enabling attackers to pivot to remote servers and infrastructure

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

The malicious dependencies act as loaders to retrieve a Rust-based infostealer targeting developer credentials and secrets

Mallory platform

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Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.