Atomic Arch
- Type
- Infostealer
- Capabilities
- Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasion
- Platforms
- Linux
Atomic Arch is a Linux software supply-chain campaign that distributes a Rust-based infostealer through compromised Arch User Repository (AUR) packages. It primarily targets developer workstations and build systems. Attackers adopt abandoned, previously legitimate AUR packages and alter their build recipes and installation hooks to introduce malicious dependencies. Successive delivery chains use npm and Bun to execute the payload. The campaign affected more than 1,500 AUR packages; Arch Linux’s official repositories were not affected.
The infostealer collects SSH keys, developer and package-registry tokens, browser cookies, collaboration-application sessions, container-registry credentials, secrets-management tokens, VPN configurations, and shell histories. It examines Chromium-family browser storage and uses stolen tokens and cookies with legitimate service APIs to validate and enrich collected information. Stolen data is uploaded to an external file-sharing service, while command-and-control communication uses a Tor onion service through a local proxy. Persistence is established through system-level or per-user systemd services, depending on execution privileges.
When already running with sufficient privileges, the payload loads the GhostMap eBPF rootkit to conceal selected processes, files, and network sockets. Its anti-analysis functionality monitors debugger attachment requests against protected processes and kills the attaching debugger or tracer. The rootkit does not provide privilege escalation. GhostMap also appears in IronWorm payloads, but shared rootkit implementation does not establish common campaign ownership. No named threat actor has been established for Atomic Arch.
Techniques & procedures
2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
VoidLink needs to hide connections on a specific port, a standard rootkit feature.
This enter_ptrace program attaches to the tp/syscalls/sys_enter_ptrace tracepoint... If the target PID matches, the program calls bpf_send_signal(9) ... It kills the debugger, not the process the debugger tried to attach to.
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
This enter_ptrace program attaches to the tp/syscalls/sys_enter_ptrace tracepoint... If the target PID matches, the program calls bpf_send_signal(9) ... It kills the debugger, not the process the debugger tried to attach to.
Observables
6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.