Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware

Atomic Arch

Tracked since Jun 12, 2026 · Updated 3 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days4 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK2Techniques
IOCs6Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasion
Platforms
Linux

Atomic Arch is a Linux software supply-chain campaign that distributes a Rust-based infostealer through compromised Arch User Repository (AUR) packages. It primarily targets developer workstations and build systems. Attackers adopt abandoned, previously legitimate AUR packages and alter their build recipes and installation hooks to introduce malicious dependencies. Successive delivery chains use npm and Bun to execute the payload. The campaign affected more than 1,500 AUR packages; Arch Linux’s official repositories were not affected.

The infostealer collects SSH keys, developer and package-registry tokens, browser cookies, collaboration-application sessions, container-registry credentials, secrets-management tokens, VPN configurations, and shell histories. It examines Chromium-family browser storage and uses stolen tokens and cookies with legitimate service APIs to validate and enrich collected information. Stolen data is uploaded to an external file-sharing service, while command-and-control communication uses a Tor onion service through a local proxy. Persistence is established through system-level or per-user systemd services, depending on execution privileges.

When already running with sufficient privileges, the payload loads the GhostMap eBPF rootkit to conceal selected processes, files, and network sockets. Its anti-analysis functionality monitors debugger attachment requests against protected processes and kills the attaching debugger or tracer. The rootkit does not provide privilege escalation. GhostMap also appears in IronWorm payloads, but shared rootkit implementation does not establish common campaign ownership. No named threat actor has been established for Atomic Arch.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

VoidLink needs to hide connections on a specific port, a standard rootkit feature.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

This enter_ptrace program attaches to the tp/syscalls/sys_enter_ptrace tracepoint... If the target PID matches, the program calls bpf_send_signal(9) ... It kills the debugger, not the process the debugger tried to attach to.

Discovery

1 technique
T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

This enter_ptrace program attaches to the tp/syscalls/sys_enter_ptrace tracepoint... If the target PID matches, the program calls bpf_send_signal(9) ... It kills the debugger, not the process the debugger tried to attach to.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
cryptika blogNews · Nov 18, 2026Hackers Use GhostMap eBPF Rootkit to Hide IronWorm Malware From Linux Security Tools | Cryptika CybersecurityNamed supply-chain campaign and associated payload in which researchers identified the same GhostMap rootkit implementation found in IronWorm. Earlier reporting traced delivery to compromised Arch User Repository build scripts. The article also lists atomic-lockfile, lockfile-js, and js-digest as delivery-chain packages. The overlap does not establish shared operators, and the detailed concealment tests concerned the IronWorm specimen.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Nov 18, 2026Hackers Use GhostMap eBPF Rootkit to Hide IronWorm Malware From Linux Security ToolsA named malicious payload and supply-chain campaign associated with compromised Arch User Repository build scripts and a listed npm delivery chain. Its payload contained the same GhostMap rootkit implementation found in IronWorm. The overlap did not establish common operators, and the detailed concealment tests applied only to the examined IronWorm specimen.Read more ↗datadog security labsNews · Jul 27, 2026Detection primitives for eBPF rootkits | Datadog Security LabsA malware campaign using eBPF rootkit techniques; the article highlights an embedded rootkit component that protects hidden processes by hooking sys_enter_ptrace and killing debuggers or tracing tools that attempt PTRACE_ATTACH or PTRACE_SEIZE against protected PIDs.Read more ↗scworldNews · Jun 17, 2026AUR suspends new registrations as 1,500-plus malicious packages flood repository | news | SC MediaA supply chain campaign targeting the Arch User Repository (AUR) in which attackers hijacked orphaned legitimate packages and inserted malicious post-install behavior that pulled malicious dependencies. Those dependencies acted as loaders for a Rust-based infostealer and an eBPF-based rootkit on affected Linux systems.Read more ↗
+2 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching6Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping2Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.