Cotx RAT
- Type
- RAT
- Capabilities
- DLL sideloadingReconnaissanceDefense evasion
- Delivery
- SpearphishingLure
- Platforms
- Windows
Cotx RAT is a Windows remote-access trojan used by the China-linked TA428 threat group in Operation LagTime IT, a cyber-espionage campaign targeting government agencies in East Asia since at least 2019. It was delivered through spear-phishing lures containing Royal Road-generated RTF documents exploiting Microsoft Equation Editor vulnerability CVE-2018-0798. The malware executes through DLL side-loading of a malicious library by a legitimate signed executable. Cotx RAT stores encrypted configuration data, uses AES-192 and Base64 encoding, and communicates using proxy-aware TLS traffic. It collects host identifiers and network-system details, and supports file operations, screenshot capture, process and installed-software enumeration, shell access, configuration updates, and self-removal. TA428 also used Poison Ivy and credential-theft and network-reconnaissance tooling alongside Cotx RAT during post-compromise operations.
Associated vulnerabilities
4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Operation LagTime IT ... Using Royal Road RTF Weaponizer, Poison Ivy and Cotx RAT. ... Cotx RAT - The original RAT used by TA428.
Techniques & procedures
20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
In early January 2020, we observed a file called ‘How Suleimani’s death will affect India and Pakistan.doc’. This file is a lure document that is the launch point for Operation LagTime IT.
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
We observed the following commands: 5 - Open command shell 6 - Open command shell as logged in user 7 - Send command to command shell
Royal Road is a tool that generates RTF files that exploit the Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802).
This legitimate Symantec binary is used to side-load RasTls.dll using DLL search-order hijacking leading to the execution of Cotx RAT malware.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
The current encrypted configuration is also stored in the registry key “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Intel\Java\user”.
When executed, writes a Word Add-In file with the “.wll” extension to the Windows Startup directory, which runs the next time Word is opened.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
When executed, writes a Word Add-In file with the “.wll” extension to the Windows Startup directory, which runs the next time Word is opened.
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
Spear phishing emails included malicious .doc attachments that were actually RTF files saved with .doc file extensions.
This legitimate Symantec binary is used to side-load RasTls.dll using DLL search-order hijacking leading to the execution of Cotx RAT malware.
Researchers at SectorB06 have noted this stage-one payload and indicated that throughout the above process it is running a “CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent” function to prevent analysis and debugging by researchers.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
The current encrypted configuration is also stored in the registry key “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Intel\Java\user”.
Discovery
5 techniques
Discovery
We observed the following commands: 14 - Process listing
The initial beacon contains “|”-delimited system information... Computer name... Username... Windows version... Architecture... Local IP addresses... First adapter's MAC address
We observed the following commands: 2 - Get directory info or drive info
We observed the following commands: 21 - Get list of installed software
Researchers at SectorB06 have noted this stage-one payload and indicated that throughout the above process it is running a “CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent” function to prevent analysis and debugging by researchers.
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
攻撃者はEternal Blueを悪用して同一ネットワーク上のいくつかのホストに移動することに成功すると、そのうちの1つのホスト上で興味深いマルウェアを動かし始めました。
Collection
1 technique
Collection
We observed the following commands: 13 - Screenshot
Command and Control
5 techniques
Command and Control
After that, it communicates with the C&C server just like the first Poison Ivy.
The command and control structure of Cotx RAT is proxy aware. It utilizes wolfSSL for TLS encrypted communication.
The command and control structure of Cotx RAT is proxy aware... Proxy IP and port discovered by searching the IPv4 TCP connection table for established connections with remote ports using common proxy ports (3128, 8080, 808, 1080) Or via WINHTTP_OPTION_PROXY.
It is used to download three cab files (‘o.cab’, ‘nbt.cab’ and ‘in.cab’) from the C&C server, and execute the files stored in the cab files.
Poison Ivy... starts working as a RAT. Cotx RAT... Tmanger... starts working as a RAT. nccTrojan... activates its C&C functions.
Impact
1 technique
Impact
We observed the following commands: 15 - Kill process
Observables
12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.