Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor4 associated CVEs

Cotx RAT

Tracked since Jun 14, 2026 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns4Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK20Techniques
IOCs12Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
DLL sideloadingReconnaissanceDefense evasion
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

Cotx RAT is a Windows remote-access trojan used by the China-linked TA428 threat group in Operation LagTime IT, a cyber-espionage campaign targeting government agencies in East Asia since at least 2019. It was delivered through spear-phishing lures containing Royal Road-generated RTF documents exploiting Microsoft Equation Editor vulnerability CVE-2018-0798. The malware executes through DLL side-loading of a malicious library by a legitimate signed executable. Cotx RAT stores encrypted configuration data, uses AES-192 and Base64 encoding, and communicates using proxy-aware TLS traffic. It collects host identifiers and network-system details, and supports file operations, screenshot capture, process and installed-software enumeration, shell access, configuration updates, and self-removal. TA428 also used Poison Ivy and credential-theft and network-reconnaissance tooling alongside Cotx RAT during post-compromise operations.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2018-0798via nao sec blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office Equation Editor Memory Corruption RCERoyal Road is a tool that generates RTF files that exploit the Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-0802via nao sec blogExploited in the wildStack Buffer Overflow in Microsoft Office Equation EditorRoyal Road is a tool that generates RTF files that exploit the Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-11882via nao sec blogExploited in the wildRemote Code Execution in Microsoft Office Equation EditorRoyal Road is a tool that generates RTF files that exploit the Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-0144via ntt security japanExploited in the wildEternalBlue攻撃者はEternal Blueを悪用して同一ネットワーク上のいくつかのホストに移動することに成功すると、そのうちの1つのホスト上で興味深いマルウェアを動かし始めました。View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
TA428

Operation LagTime IT ... Using Royal Road RTF Weaponizer, Poison Ivy and Cotx RAT. ... Cotx RAT - The original RAT used by TA428.

via vb2020 vblocalhostvb2020.vblocalhost.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

In early January 2020, we observed a file called ‘How Suleimani’s death will affect India and Pakistan.doc’. This file is a lure document that is the launch point for Operation LagTime IT.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

We observed the following commands: 5 - Open command shell 6 - Open command shell as logged in user 7 - Send command to command shell

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2

Royal Road is a tool that generates RTF files that exploit the Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-0802).

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

This legitimate Symantec binary is used to side-load RasTls.dll using DLL search-order hijacking leading to the execution of Cotx RAT malware.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The current encrypted configuration is also stored in the registry key “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Intel\Java\user”.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

When executed, writes a Word Add-In file with the “.wll” extension to the Windows Startup directory, which runs the next time Word is opened.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

When executed, writes a Word Add-In file with the “.wll” extension to the Windows Startup directory, which runs the next time Word is opened.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Spear phishing emails included malicious .doc attachments that were actually RTF files saved with .doc file extensions.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

This legitimate Symantec binary is used to side-load RasTls.dll using DLL search-order hijacking leading to the execution of Cotx RAT malware.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Researchers at SectorB06 have noted this stage-one payload and indicated that throughout the above process it is running a “CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent” function to prevent analysis and debugging by researchers.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The current encrypted configuration is also stored in the registry key “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Intel\Java\user”.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

We observed the following commands: 14 - Process listing

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The initial beacon contains “|”-delimited system information... Computer name... Username... Windows version... Architecture... Local IP addresses... First adapter's MAC address

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

We observed the following commands: 2 - Get directory info or drive info

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

We observed the following commands: 21 - Get list of installed software

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Researchers at SectorB06 have noted this stage-one payload and indicated that throughout the above process it is running a “CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent” function to prevent analysis and debugging by researchers.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

攻撃者はEternal Blueを悪用して同一ネットワーク上のいくつかのホストに移動することに成功すると、そのうちの1つのホスト上で興味深いマルウェアを動かし始めました。

Collection

1 technique
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

We observed the following commands: 13 - Screenshot

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

After that, it communicates with the C&C server just like the first Poison Ivy.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The command and control structure of Cotx RAT is proxy aware. It utilizes wolfSSL for TLS encrypted communication.

T1090ProxyEvidence1

The command and control structure of Cotx RAT is proxy aware... Proxy IP and port discovered by searching the IPv4 TCP connection table for established connections with remote ports using common proxy ports (3128, 8080, 808, 1080) Or via WINHTTP_OPTION_PROXY.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

It is used to download three cab files (‘o.cab’, ‘nbt.cab’ and ‘in.cab’) from the C&C server, and execute the files stored in the cab files.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

Poison Ivy... starts working as a RAT. Cotx RAT... Tmanger... starts working as a RAT. nccTrojan... activates its C&C functions.

Impact

1 technique
T1489Service StopEvidence1

We observed the following commands: 15 - Kill process

Indicators of compromise

Observables

12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+4 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching12Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities4CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping20Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.