Loading malware…
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The attack carried out in 2019 was completely different from the one described above. It involved using two frameworks – dubbed Careto2 and Goreto.
6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A malicious framework used in the 2019 intrusion. It is installed via a loader, installer, and registry file, persists through COM hijacking, stores plugins in a virtual file system, and includes modules for configuration management, file monitoring, storage of stolen files, screenshots, and exfiltration to attacker-controlled OneDrive.
A modular spyware framework installed via a batch file and COM hijacking of SharedTaskScheduler. Its loader propagates into processes, decrypts plugins from an encrypted virtual file system, and supports configuration management, storage, keylogging, screenshot capture, file monitoring, and OneDrive-based exfiltration.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.