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Malware1 associated actor

SUNSPINNER

Tracked since Jun 14, 2026 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs10Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UNC5812

Common between these distinct delivery chains is the parallel delivery of a decoy mapping application tracked as SUNSPINNER, which displays to users a map that renders purported locations of Ukrainian military recruits from an actor-controlled command-and-control (C2) server.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

UNC5812’s malware delivery operations are conducted both via an actor-controlled Telegram channel @civildefense_com_ua and website hosted at civildefense[.]com.ua.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

The ultimate aim of the campaign is to have victims navigate to the UNC5812-controlled "Civil Defense" website, which advertises several different software programs for different operating systems. When installed, these programs result in the download of various commodity malware families.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The ultimate aim of the campaign is to have victims navigate to the UNC5812-controlled "Civil Defense" website, which advertises several different software programs for different operating systems.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence2

UNC5812’s malware delivery operations are conducted both via an actor-controlled Telegram channel @civildefense_com_ua and website hosted at civildefense[.]com.ua. To drive potential victims towards these actor-controlled resources, we assess that UNC5812 is likely purchasing promoted posts in legitimate, established Ukrainian-language Telegram channels.

Execution

2 techniques
T1106Native APIEvidence1

When opened, this version requests the Android REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES permission from the user, which if granted, downloads the CRAXSRAT payload.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

If installed with Google Play Protect disabled, these programs deliver an operating system-specific commodity malware variant to the victim alongside a decoy mapping application we track as SUNSPINNER.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

"Civil Defense" claims to be a provider of free software programs designed to enable potential conscripts to view and share crowdsourced locations of Ukrainian military recruiters.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Pronsis Loader initiates a convoluted malware delivery chain, ultimately delivering SUNSPINNER and a commodity information stealer commonly known as PURESTEALER.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

When executed, SUNSPINNER attempts to resolve a new "backend server" hostname from http://h315225216.nichost[.]ru/... followed by a request for map markers from https://fu-laravel.onrender[.]com/api/markers.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Pronsis Loader is used to retrieve both the decoy SUNSPINNER binary and a second-stage downloader "civildefensestarter.exe" ... initiating a multi-stage delivery chain ... which ultimately executes PURESTEALER on the victim device.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

10 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.

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No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching10Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.