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Mallory
Malware3 associated actors

GoClient

Tracked since Jun 14, 2026 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs13Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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BackdoorDiplomacy

In addition to the QSC framework, the attackers also deployed a new backdoor written in Golang, which we have named “GoClient”.

via securelistsecurelist.com
CloudComputating

In addition to the QSC framework, the attackers also deployed a new backdoor written in Golang, which we have named “GoClient”.

via securelistsecurelist.com
Faking Dragon

In addition to the QSC framework, the attackers also deployed a new backdoor written in Golang, which we have named “GoClient”.

via securelistsecurelist.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

The Command Shell module launches % windir % \ system32 \ cmd . exe as a shell using the CreateProcess API, and data is written to and read from the shell using pipes.

Stealth

1 technique
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

dc191340 Close the connection, delete its own module file and terminate its own process.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

systeminfo ipconfig / all netstat - ano - p tcp

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

ping 172.19.19.1 - n 1 ping 172.19.19.2 - n 1 tracert 172.19.19.2 netstat - ano ping - a 172.17.104.102 - n 1

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Send target information (e.g. computer name, user name, OS version, etc.)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

0x0A20010 If the sub-command is < root > , then get the logical drive letters and types in the system. Otherwise, send a list of files and folders at a specified path.

T1087.002Domain AccountEvidence1

The domain controller was queried to view the list of users within the groups “domain controllers” and “domain computers” ... Next, the actor tried to list the users under the group “domain admins”

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

0x0A20012 Read the file and send it to the C2.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

26c108d6 Create a screenshot of the machine and save on a file named cap . png .

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

c : \ inetpub \ temp \ rar . exe a c : \ inetpub \ temp \ s . rar c : \ inetpub \ temp \ * . dat

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1090ProxyEvidence1

the C2 in the configuration data contained an internal/proxy IP address, which suggested that the attackers were already aware of the target network topology.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

In addition to the QSC framework, the attackers also deployed a new backdoor written in Golang, which we have named “GoClient”.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

13 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching13Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.